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My Lords, our amendments in this group concern the future of the bank ring-fencing regime. I will start by setting out clearly the position that we have reached as the Official Opposition. Through our diagnostic work, we have found a consensus that the bank ring-fencing regime is no longer fit for purpose. It adds costs to banks and their customers and it has been superseded by other rules since its introduction. A regulatory regime should not be preserved simply because it exists. It must continue to justify itself against present-day risks, tools and costs. In our view, the ring-fencing regime no longer does so. The next Conservative Government would repeal the post-global financial crisis ring-fencing regime, bringing the United Kingdom more closely into line with other international jurisdictions. Amendment 160A reflects that policy.
It is worth reminding ourselves what ring-fencing is. The regime was created through the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which amended FSMA 2000. The implementing regulations and orders came into effect in 2019, more than 10 years after the onset of the global financial crisis. At its core, ring-fencing is the structural separation of certain retail banking activities from activities normally conducted by international wholesale investment banks. In practice, that means a separate legal entity, with restrictions on what it can do and how it can interact with the rest of the banking group. Retail and small business deposit-taking is placed inside the ring-fence, while certain other activities must be conducted outside it.
The regime was introduced for serious reasons. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, convened after the financial crisis, identified three broad objectives: to make it easier to deal with failing banks without taxpayer-funded solvency support; to insulate vital banking services used by households and SMEs from problems elsewhere in the financial system; and to curtail implicit government guarantees, thereby reducing risks to public finances and incentives for excessive risk-taking.
Since ring-fencing was designed, the wider regulatory landscape has changed profoundly. We now have a much more developed resolution regime. We have recovery and resolution planning. We have operational continuity arrangements in resolution. We have stronger capital and liquidity requirements. We have the leverage ratio, the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio. The Bank of England, the PRA and the FPC have a broad toolkit for reducing the risk of bank failure and dealing with failure if it occurs. Moreover, we have sounder management of banks as a result of the senior management regime.
That is precisely the point that we wish to highlight in our amendment. The risks that ring-fencing was designed to address are now addressed through other more modern, more targeted and more internationally coherent tools. The 2022 Independent Panel on Ring-fencing and Proprietary Trading, chaired by Sir Keith Skeoch, reported that the regime has an annual cost to the UK banking sector of around £1.5 billion, which comes from running multiple separate legal entities, duplicating governance systems and raising the cost of capital and lending conducted by non-ring-fenced bodies. This is because large retail deposits inside the ring-fence cannot be used as sources of finance elsewhere in a group to support lending and investment. That review also found that the reduction in the implicit government guarantee and progress in ending “too big to fail” were not attributable to ring-fencing but instead to the development of the UK resolution regime. Ring-fencing is therefore a good example of a broader problem in financial services regulation: rules that are introduced in response to a crisis which then remain in place long after the conditions that justified the change.
We are now left with two regimes that are not aligned in the way that they aim to address “too big to fail”. That adds complexity, cost and burden. It also risks making the United Kingdom less competitive than jurisdictions that rely on resolution, prudential supervision and capital frameworks, rather than structural separation of this kind. Clauses 39 and 40 show that the Government recognise that there is a problem. They seek to make changes to the ring-fencing regime and give the PRA more flexibility over ring-fencing arrangements, but in our view these reforms do not go far enough.
Amendment 160A would repeal Part 9B of FSMA and the core statutory ring-fencing provisions introduced after the financial crisis. It would require the Treasury, the PRA, the FCA and the Bank of England to take the necessary steps to unwind the related rules and guidance. It would require an orderly transition, with attention paid to financial stability, continuity of core banking services and the competitiveness of the United Kingdom. Consumer savings would continue to be protected. Banks would continue to be subject to prudential supervision. Resolution planning would remain in place.
This reform matters for competitiveness. Other major financial centres do not operate a UK-style ring-fencing regime. If UK banks are required to carry costs and structural constraints that their international competitors do not face, that affects the cost and availability of finance. It affects the ability of banks to deploy capital efficiently and it affects the attractiveness of the UK as a place to operate and invest in. It also matters for customers. Regulations that increase costs without delivering commensurate benefit feed through into pricing, service innovation and lending capacity.
If the Government believe that ring-fencing remains necessary, will the Minister explain precisely what financial stability objective it now achieves that is not already achieved through the resolution regime and other prudential rules? Ring-fencing was created in response to a particular crisis at a particular moment for reasons that were understandable at the time. But regulation must evolve. It must be reviewed against current conditions. It must be removed when it no longer serves its intended purpose.
Finally, I would add that whatever changes are made, it is right to have a proper process of consultation with business and stakeholders and a follow-up report to Parliament. That is the purpose of my Amendments 159 and 174.
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My Lords, if I may respond to that, I had thought until recently that what we were debating was a response to the Skeoch commission established by the last Government, but we have new amendments now, it seems—Amendment 160A and the abandonment of clauses—that are really throwing ring-fencing out. I guess that they are tabled in response to a speech by the leader of the Conservative Party, Kemi Badenoch—a speech underpinned by a policy document from her party. That speech, the policy document and this amendment are not asking to think things through further from the Skeoch report: they have made their minds up. Kemi Badenoch announced that a future Conservative Government will end ring-fencing—definitive end of discussion. That, I believe, would be a bad idea. So did the review by Keith Skeoch, who was commissioned by the Conservative Government to opine on this and whose recommendations we are now trying to take forward.