Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

My Lords, I want to address a few key areas before we begin. First, we are starting today with the debate on an adjourned group. Only those noble Lords present earlier in the week at the start of the group should contribute. We have a list to help manage that. I am expecting, based on the adjourned debate, that debate will go straight to Front-Bench contributions. Secondly, on the general rules, I remind noble Lords again that they should declare any relevant financial interest the first time they speak at each stage of the Bill. This means that, in Committee, relevant financial interests should be declared during the first group to which the noble Lord contributes. The declaration does not need to be repeated in debate on later groups at this stage. The declaration should be specific and brief. Members should briefly indicate the nature of their financial interests and not simply refer to their entry in the Register of Lords’ Interests. I remind the Committee of the guidance in paragraph 8.82 of the Companion that, when withdrawing amendments, noble Lords should be brief, need not respond to all the points made during the debate and should not revisit points made when moving the amendment. A number of contributions made when withdrawing amendments on previous days were lengthy. I encourage all participants to keep their remarks short, in the spirit of the Companion.

My Lords, I am sure everyone has reread the Hansard transcript and is fully on top of the debate that took place on Monday, so I will attempt to keep my remarks brief. I am tempted to engage with the challenge from the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, on this group of amendments, to discuss in depth the issue of international rules on the one hand versus growth and competition objectives on the other. However, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, as the Whip, that I recognise that we are in Grand Committee and so will limit the comments that I make. Looking at this group of amendments, it is important to say that my party believes in “better together” rather than “beggar thy neighbour”. International rules provide trust, confidence and certainty, which are key to long-term and sustainable growth. This country plays a key role in shaping international rules in sectors that we care about, including finance. The Bank of England is incredibly highly respected, as are our other regulators. There is extensive participation in key bodies, such as the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and others. Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, gave a long list of the various committees in which regulators are engaged. I think she thought it might make them go native, but I consider that it is an important opportunity and area of their influence. We remain a player in making those rules, despite Brexit. International rules need to provide flexibility, but they mean absolutely nothing if we pick only what suits us in the moment. The world is not thriving in the beggar-thy-neighbour world of Trump in the United States, of Russia and of China. The Committee will not be surprised that I am not sympathetic to Amendment 99, which would reduce international standards to a “have regard”. As for the other amendments on this sector, I have no problem with the reporting amendments, but I am cautious of Amendments 102 and 104A, because they could easily be read as an instruction to waver on the Bank of England’s primary objective of financial stability. We must be careful not to abandon that focus on financial stability. Some people find volatility attractive—it is certainly a way in which the financial sector has frequently made much of its money. But the cost to ordinary people of both boom and bust and continuous volatility has been exceedingly high. The cost to businesses that need a significant measure of certainty is extremely high. Therefore, we will not be supporting these amendments, though, as I say, the reporting amendments make some sense to me.

My Lords, for me, the group speaks to the essential balance which underpins the purpose and function of effective financial regulation. Of course regulation must promote safety, stability and confidence in the system, but regulation must also support growth, competitiveness and innovation. It must help ensure that the United Kingdom remains one of the world’s leading financial centres. We have often spoken about the contribution that financial institutions and financial services firms make to the UK economy; they provide employment, tax revenue, investment, lending, infrastructure and global influence. This group is about making sure that we put our money where our mouth is. If we say that competitiveness and growth matter then those principles must be reflected in the way regulators act, report and make their decisions. That is why Amendment 99, to which I have added my name, is important. It would shift the requirement from “aligning with” international standards to considering international standards. That is an important distinction. International standards matter, and in many cases the UK will rightly wish to follow them, but we should not place ourselves in a position where we become passive rule-takers when it is not in our national interest to do so. We can see some rules, such as the unbundling of research in MiFID II, having totally the wrong effect—in this instance, regulating research so heavily that less research is produced, particularly for smaller firms. I know this from relatives who work in analysis; I do not think that is an interest, but it is evidence. Another example is the EU’s sustainable finance disclosure regulation, which is now under review because it is too complex and burdensome. The whole point of having an independent post-Brexit regulatory framework is that the UK should be able to design rules that work for our markets, our firms and our economy. The UK’s position in financial services is not secured by right. Other jurisdictions are moving quickly. We know the compliance costs are generally higher in the UK, so unless we offer a regulatory environment that is clearer, more cohesive, more predictable and more conducive to growth, it is likely that firms, capital and innovation will go overseas, the opposite of what we and the Government want. We are already seeing this risk in areas such as digital finance. Firms in digital assets, payments and new financial infrastructure need clarity and confidence. Where they do not find it in the UK, they look elsewhere. The Employment Rights Act is also having a chilling effect. Amendments 100 and 101 are important because they would strengthen accountability around the competitiveness and growth objective. It is not enough for regulators simply to say that they have considered competitiveness. Parliament needs to see how that objective has been applied, what evidence has been used, what impacts have been assessed—for example, on SMEs, which are a key feature of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral’s amendment—and how regulatory decisions have affected firms and markets over time. Amendment 102, which I have also supported, would extend the secondary competitiveness and growth objective to the Bank of England’s financial market infrastructure functions. The same should apply to Amendment 104A on payment systems. If we want a dynamic payments ecosystem, competitiveness must be considered across the whole regulatory architecture.

My Lords, the Government share the views of many in this debate, particularly on the importance of ensuring that the secondary growth and competitiveness objectives are comprehensively embedded in the work of the regulators. That is why the Bill legislates to extend the requirement for the regulators to produce annual reports on their actions to advance competitiveness and growth objectives. Amendment 99 would amend the secondary objective so that when carrying it out the regulators would need only to consider international standards, rather than to align with them. I recognise the desire to ensure that there are no unnecessary constraints on the secondary objective. However, the Government cannot accept this amendment. Aligning with international standards is central to the Government’s approach to supporting the international competitiveness of the UK as a global financial centre. These international standards underpin global financial resilience and support international trade. Stability, predictability and high regulatory standards are the cornerstone of the UK’s reputation as a global financial centre. Weakening the requirement to align would risk undermining the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business. However, it is worth noting that the UK is no passive recipient of international standards: we help to shape them. The Governor of the Bank of England is the current chair of the Financial Stability Board, and the UK authorities play leading roles in international bodies. I reassure noble Lords that international standards generally operate on a comply-or-explain basis. No standard trumps the objectives of the FCA or the PRA. Where it is right for the UK to go further, or where the nuances of our market require a different approach, the FCA and the PRA retain full flexibility to do so. Amendments 100 and 101 would require the growth and competitiveness reports to be laid in Parliament and would prescribe their contents. These amendments clearly demonstrate the importance this House places on the growth and competitiveness reports. The Government absolutely agree about that. Since they were introduced in FSMA 2023, their value to stakeholders in Parliament and industry has been clearly demonstrated, which is why the Bill extends the original temporary requirement and will require the regulators to keep producing the reports on an annual basis. However, these amendments are not necessary: they are overly prescriptive and overlap with existing reporting mechanisms. For example, the regulators already provide ample public reporting on their authorisation metrics, which are published regularly and allow for year-on-year comparisons, and they already publish metrics along with their competitiveness and growth reports. Amendment 102 would give the Bank of England a secondary objective to facilitate international competitiveness and growth in its regulation of central counterparties and central securities depositories. The Government recognise the importance of a dynamic and competitive UK clearing and settlement market. However, CCPs and CSDs have a unique role in managing risk at the centre of global financial markets and the value they provide is based on reliability and sound risk management. The UK’s success as a global centre for financial market infrastructure depends on its reputation for resilience, and regulation must reflect the roles of CCPs and CSDs as critical, globally shared infrastructure. The Government therefore do not believe that it would be appropriate for the regulatory framework for these firms to focus on international competitiveness or growth in the same way as other firms, or that the secondary objective for the Bank to facilitate innovation is the right one. However, the Chancellor made it clear in her remit letter to the Bank last year that it should consider how it can best support the Government’s growth mission when pursuing its objectives. Lastly, Amendment 104A seeks to introduce new secondary objectives for the Bank of England in relation to payment systems. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this issue. The Government recognise that, where appropriate, secondary objectives can help the regulator to advance its primary objective in a balanced way. Payment systems are critical economic infrastructure and the Government agree that, alongside security and resilience, regulation in this area should support competition, innovation and growth. However, the Government consider that the Bill already provides a framework that supports the aims of the amendment. Following the FCA taking on the responsibilities of payment systems regulations, it will retain the substance of the PSR’s objectives. This means that it will be responsible for promoting competition and innovation in payment systems and for protecting the interests of service users. The Bill also applies the FCA’s secondary competitive and growth objective to its general payment system functions and it includes provision to ensure that the Bank and the FCA co-ordinate effectively. I therefore ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today and the previous day. These amendments all relate to the secondary competitive and growth objective. I think that we share the same desire to have an effective secondary competitive and growth objective, which my lead amendment, in particular, was designed to ensure. The Minister says that the regulators have flexibility to do what is right, whatever the international standards. I do not think that that is captured by forcing alignment with standards, but I will think again about that before Report. I was also disappointed by the Minister’s other replies, because it seems that the Government are not taking opportunities to ram home the importance of growth and competitiveness, which is something that we fully support. I will withdraw my amendment now and consider what I shall bring back on Report.

My Lords, I rise enthusiastically—we have to get going for the football—to move Amendment 105, in my name and the name of my noble friend Lord Altrincham. I will also speak to the other amendments in the group. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes for his amendments, which seek to achieve broadly the same objective as ours. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising for Amendment 151, which raises an important question about whether experienced and well-regarded individuals with a strong regulatory track record should be able to benefit from a more streamlined authorisation process. Fundamentally, the amendments in the group all seek to make regulatory approvals faster, clearer and less prone to delay. We have heard throughout our consideration of the Bill that delays in authorisations, approvals and permissions are a brake on growth. They affect firms’ ability to enter the market, to expand, to appoint senior people and to innovate and compete. The Government recognise the problem: Clause 21 reduces a number of statutory determination periods, including for Part 4A permission applications, senior manager approvals and other regulatory decisions. That is welcome. However, the question is whether the Bill goes far enough and whether the powers that it creates are sufficiently disciplined. One concern raised with us by firms is that the authorisations process can feel driven by deadline, rather than workflow. The issue is not only whether the FCA or PRA technically meets the statutory deadline; it is whether substantive work begins early enough in the process. If a case is not allocated promptly, if an initial review takes place only late in the period, or if information requests are made close to the deadline, the firm bears unnecessary costs and uncertainty, even if the regulator ultimately meets the formal target. My first set of amendments today—Amendments 105, 110, 113 and 114—would ensure that the Treasury’s power to alter these time limits could be used only to reduce them. If the purpose of the Bill—and, indeed, the Government’s wider financial services strategy—is to make the regulatory system more streamlined and fit for purpose, success must be measured in part by reductions in the time taken to make decisions. I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic to that principle. The Treasury should be able to shorten regulatory approval periods where experience shows that this can be done safely, and it should not be able to lengthen them without returning to Parliament with a clear and specific justification. The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Holmes take a similar approach but go further by proposing an automatic ratcheting-down mechanism. Where regulators had met the applicable time period for a defined period, the Treasury would be required to reduce the time limit further. That is a sensible principle of continuous improvement. If regulators consistently demonstrate that they can meet a deadline, we should be willing to ask whether that deadline can become more ambitious. Amendment 109 concerns the FCA’s ability to stop the clock during the senior managers approvals process. We have heard from industry that the power to stop the clock can be used repeatedly during an approvals process. That is extremely frustrating for firms. It makes workforce planning more difficult and can leave firms waiting for months without any real sense of when a decision will be made. Stop the clock powers can render the headline statutory deadline almost meaningless. Amendment 109 would, therefore, allow the FCA to use the formal stop the clock mechanism only once in relation to a senior manager approval application. When it does so, the FCA would be required, as far as is reasonably practicable, to specify all the information that it requires at that point. The FCA could still ask for further information later, but that later request would not stop the statutory clock. As I have said, delays in approvals can affect business decisions, market entry, expansion, restructuring and succession planning. They can discourage talented individuals from taking up roles in the UK if they fear that the process will be slow, uncertain or opaque, and they could even put at risk our reputation as a leading financial centre. I welcome Amendment 151 in the name of my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising. It asks whether there should be a more streamlined or expedited Part 4A authorisation process where the applicant is managed or directed by individuals with an established FCA-approved—or PRA-approved, I assume—track record and good regulatory standing. A review could help to identify where duplication exists and where good regulatory history can be taken into account in a practical way. I would be grateful if the Minister could address three questions. First, what do the Government see as a reasonable timeframe for the approval of new products, new services and senior managers? Those of us who are used to more dynamic sectors think that the new targets are insufficiently challenging, but let us hear what they are. Secondly, do the Government accept the principle that the Treasury’s power to change approval time limits should be used only to reduce them, not increase them? If the Government do not accept that, in what circumstances do they envisage the Treasury using this power to lengthen regulatory approval periods? Thirdly, what safeguards exist to ensure that the FCA’s stop the clock powers are used proportionately and not in a way that undermines the statutory deadline? We cannot talk about growth, competitiveness and innovation while tolerating unnecessary delays in the basic processes that allow firms to operate and people to take up senior roles. We know from history that we need strong management, as well as strong and challenging non-executive directors for our banks, but we also need an efficient approvals system that supports that. I beg to move.

My Lords, what a pleasure it is to follow my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. I agree with everything she said, with all the principles she set out and with the amendments in this group. I shall speak to Amendment 106 and the other amendments in my name. We are asking a lot of our financial regulators and it is only right that we offer help in the Bill. When we come to the Minister’s response—I do not want in any sense to pre-empt him—there may be comments around the amendments being overly prescriptive. I suggest that these amendments do not ask for prescription but, in fact, deliver clarity and, in a sense, are variously helpful to our financial services regulators. My amendments seek to offer that help but also, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe said, to assist in driving that high-performance culture. Our regulators are well-regarded around the world. That is about high performance, but high performance in its turn is about continuous development and improvement. I think that this Bill can assist in that purpose. In essence, this is all about the “E”s in this group: efficiency, effectiveness and economic activity. It is often said that delay defeats equity. In this instance, delay defeats economic activity and economic growth. It frustrates small, medium and larger businesses in what they are trying to do right across the United Kingdom economies. I believe that this suite of amendments offers clarity to the regulator and that, through that clarity, the regulator can give the right direction and the right support to all our businesses to do what they do best, which is to create economic activity and drive and deliver economic growth. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

My Lords, I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, an FCA-regulated entity. These amendments in the names of my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lord Altrincham and Lord Holmes concern Clause 21, which I very much welcome in principle. The improvements to regulators’ approval timelines are a positive step, as are the powers within the clause that enable the Government to amend those timeframes over time. In effect, the Bill already recognises the need for a mechanism to drive improvement. However, the evidence suggests that we can and should go further. The fact that regulators have consistently met their existing targets—targets that have remained largely unchanged for some 25 years—indicates that there is clear scope for more ambitious deadlines. These amendments are therefore designed to embed a culture of continuous improvement, as referred to by my noble friend Lord Holmes. They would ensure that any future changes to the timeframe set out in Clause 21 could move in only one direction, towards faster decision-making. Moreover, where regulators have consistently met revised targets over a period of two years, the Treasury would be required to reduce those timelines further. In doing so, we would place a statutory obligation on the system to evolve and improve. This matters greatly for the competitiveness of the United Kingdom, particularly for the insurance market in which I work. The speed at which regulators handle authorisations, variations of permission and approvals for senior managers has a direct impact on the ease of doing business. These processes define many firms’ day-to-day interactions with regulation and shape broader perceptions of our market. Firms today have choices about where to deploy capital, where to grow and where to locate talent. A regulatory system that is clear, predictable and timely is a key part of that decision-making calculus. The UK must offer a compelling proposition. There are many other places to go. Evidence from the London Market Group reinforces this point. A recent survey of firms regulated by the FCA and the PRA shows that both institutions are respected with strong overall scores, yet concerns remain. More than half of firms believe that aspects of the FCA’s approach negatively affect the attractiveness of the London market, and nearly nine in 10 highlight slow approvals for senior managers as having a strong detrimental impact on their operations. Improving timelines is not about reducing standards; it is about ensuring that our system supports growth, innovation and competitiveness. These amendments help to achieve just that.

My Lords, I should like to speak briefly and, in so doing, declare my interest as an adviser to and shareholder in Banco Santander. I very much support these amendments. I think that we would all agree that we want our regulations and the entire process to be simple and robust, as that is the bedrock of a competitive global financial centre. I do not think that anyone here is arguing for a weakening to the extent that it would undermine confidence in the market, which is absolutely critical. To support what has just been said, I draw your Lordships’ attention to a study that TheCityUK brought out a few years ago—I think in 2023. It highlighted in its survey concerns among those in the City about the speed of regulatory requirements. If I am reading it right, of those who responded to the survey and were undergoing FCA regulatory approvals, 92% were experiencing delay. If you look at the views on the opaqueness of the systems, which indeed adds to uncertainty and undermines investor confidence, an enormous percentage—almost 100%—saw the system as opaque or somewhat opaque. If one then looks further on in this study at the perceived overall impact that the efficiency of the regulators’ authorisation processes had on the attractiveness of the UK as a place to establish and do business, in terms of the FCA, if my maths serves me right, almost 90% saw it as detrimental or somewhat detrimental to the UK’s attractiveness. I am sure that the FCA and others are doing their best to solve this issue, but these amendments would do a lot to add pressure to that process and would strengthen the resolve within the system to address what is a clear need if we are to build on the competitiveness of London as a financial centre.

My Lords, my Amendment 151 seeks to enable employment in the financial services industry to be made more efficient. At present, Section 55V of FSMA requires the Financial Conduct Authority to determine a complete application for Part 4A permission within six months and an incomplete application within 12 months. These statutory limits provide certainty but do not distinguish between entirely new market entrants and applicants who have previously been authorised and regulated by the FCA. Many experienced financial services professionals have already undergone extensive regulatory scrutiny, have held approved positions within FCA-authorised firms and possess established records of compliance, integrity and competence. Despite this, when establishing a new authorised firm, they are often subject to the same authorisation timetable as applicants with no prior regulatory history. This approach can create unnecessary delays, increase costs, discourage entrepreneurship and inhibit competition within the UK financial services sector. It is also inconsistent with the Government’s broader objective of promoting growth, innovation and international competitiveness within the UK financial markets. I propose that His Majesty’s Government consider introducing a fast-track authorisation process whereby applicants who have previously been authorised by the FCA or who have held FCA-approved senior management or controlled functions for a substantial period, have no record of serious regulatory misconduct, meet all threshold conditions and prudential requirements and submit a complete application should receive a determination from the FCA within 90 days of the application being submitted. Such a provision would not reduce regulatory standards. It would recognise that the FCA already possesses significant information regarding the applicant’s competence, conduct, fitness and propriety. The FCA would retain full discretion to refuse applications where concerns arise, but qualifying applicants would benefit from a more proportionate and efficient regulatory process. The United Kingdom’s reputation as a leading global financial centre depends on regulation that is not only effective but efficient. A targeted, expedited process for proven and reputable applicants would help reduce barriers to market entry, encourage innovation, support economic growth and make the UK a more attractive jurisdiction in which to establish regulated businesses. It would tie in with the Government’s declared interest in reducing burdensome regulation, which impedes growth in the economy.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lords, Lord Altrincham and Lord Holmes, for tabling these amendments on statutory deadlines for regulatory approvals. The Government agree that determining authorisations and other regulatory applications must be prompt and proportionate, while maintaining high standards, and they continue to push the regulators to be as ambitious as possible. This is why the Government are taking action to shorten a range of statutory deadlines through the Bill and, on top of this, have agreed voluntary stretch targets for the regulators to go further and faster to speed up the processing of the most crucial applications and facilitate growth. This focus is starting to pay off: for example, the FCA’s authorisation metrics for the last quarter show that the FCA determined 99.9% of senior manager applications within the existing three-month deadline, compared to 92.5% in the same quarter for 2022-23. In addition, the FCA determined 98.1% of senior manager applications within its two-month voluntary stretch target, determining 50% of authorisations within only 19 days. Amendments 105, 106, 110, 111, 113, 114 and 115 seek to ensure that the Treasury can use the power under Clause 21 to reduce the deadlines for determining applications. The Government understand the intention behind these amendments. The Government are committed to keeping these statutory deadlines under review to ensure that they are as ambitious as possible to support firms. The intention behind this is primarily to allow certain deadlines to be shortened further if conditions change in future and the regulators can process applications faster. However, it is vital that the regulatory framework reflects the need for a robust approvals process and the high standards expected of firms operating in the UK. Limiting the Government’s ability to recalibrate the statutory deadlines in the other direction would limit our ability to react to unexpected circumstances and could risk those high standards being watered down or push the regulators to refuse more applications to ensure they are meeting their legal obligations. This is why the Government’s view is that the powers must remain flexible. Amendments 107, 112 and 116 would oblige the Government further to shorten these statutory deadlines should the regulator meet these deadlines for two consecutive years. The Government understand the intention and ambition behind these amendments but do not agree that this is the right way to achieve it. Meeting an existing deadline for two consecutive years does not in and of itself mean that further shortening the deadline will be appropriate and could risk watering down standards. Such a ratcheting mechanism could also drive perverse behaviour, disincentivising the regulators meeting these deadlines to avoid further operational pressures. The Government’s view is that these amendments would prevent the exact outcome they are seeking to achieve. On Amendment 109, I understand the concern that statutory deadlines are less meaningful if the FCA can repeatedly stop the clock and make rolling requests for information. The Government recognise the frustrations that firms feel when applications are paused or when they receive repeated requests for information. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked about the proportionality of circumstances in which the FCA can indeed stop the clock. The FCA can stop the clock only in three specific circumstances under FSMA: for change of control, senior manager and appointed representative applications. This power allows the FCA fully to investigate issues that emerge only after an initial response has been received or where further clarification is needed on matters that were not reasonably identifiable at the outset. This is important for ensuring that robust standards are applied. The Government think it is important that the regulators retain some flexibility to scrutinise senior manager applications properly. A rigid rule limiting the formal stop the clock power to a single occasion risks weakening the regulator’s ability to conduct proper scrutiny in more complex cases, which it does only on very few occasions when really necessary. It also risks encouraging broad, defensive and overly onerous initial information requests as the FCA seeks to adjust procedures to the new requirement, potentially making the process more onerous for all applications. However, I do not want to sound complacent: the Government will continue to engage with the regulators to ensure that they are processing applications as quickly as possible while maintaining standards and avoiding delays.

I would like some clarification from the Minister. Does he have, at his fingertips, figures around the stop the clock function? Are the Government currently satisfied with how the function is being used?

Let me come back to the noble Lord with that data; I had it in the original draft, but it seems that we have passed it out. I will write to the noble Lord over the coming days. Our belief is that the right answer is not to hardwire this procedural restriction into primary legislation but to continue improving operational performance and scrutiny of timelines through our wider framework. Amendment 108 would insert detailed operational requirements into FSMA for the handling of authorisation applications. I recognise the attraction of measurable standards on case allocation, initial review, information requests, publication of monitoring data and limiting the use of the stop the clock mechanism. However, as we discussed earlier, the FSMA model delegates certain responsibilities to the independent regulators and, like any other organisation, they need to figure out how to fulfil those responsibilities. They are responsible for ensuring that they have the resources, systems and processes needed to discharge their functions effectively. The right approach for Parliament and the Government is to hold the regulators to account for speed, service quality and operational effectiveness, not to prescribe in primarily legislation the detailed mechanics of how an application must be processed. I have been passed the data that was in the original speech, which answers the question from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. In the year 2025-26, in 55% of FCA solo-regulated senior management applications there was no stop the clock and for 32% of cases the clock was stopped only once. Even when the FCA does use its stop the clock power, it continues to determine applications promptly. In Q4 of 2025-26, 50% of senior manager cases were determined within 19 days. As mentioned previously, 99% were determined within the new target of two months.

I thank the Minister for those statistics and very much appreciate him having them in front of him. This ability to elucidate such detail is incredibly helpful. He set out the importance of enabling the regulator to continue to have the option to increase timelines, rather than just having them set as they are or being able to reduce them, as our amendments suggest. Would he be able to set out to the Grand Committee perhaps four or five examples of where it would be helpful for the regulator to increase timelines?

I understand that the regulator does not have the power to increase deadlines without our consent.

The wording in the Bill is “changing”, so it can go up or down, but we are asking for it to be reduced. That is significantly different.

The noble Lord makes an important point, but the regulator does not have that power. Only the Treasury can grant that power to increase the timelines.

Then the Treasury can do it, but it should be down and not up.

I think this requires some further detail. It is an affirmative power that the Treasury has to regulate, but I will write to the noble Lord in full to make sure that he understands that we are taking this issue seriously. I turn to Amendment 151 and thank the noble Lord, Lord Howard, for raising this. I know that it reflects a long-standing frustration that credible firms, particularly those led by individuals already known to the regulator, may still face lengthy authorisation processes that can delay market entry and inhibit innovation and growth. However, while the previous approval and track record of senior individuals is clearly relevant to the regulator’s assessment, authorising a firm is not simply a matter of approving the people who run it. The regulators must assess the firm as a whole, including its business model, governance, systems and controls, and whether it is capable of operating safely and in the interests of its customers. The Government recognise the importance of timely and effective authorisation processes, especially for new firms. This is why the Government are shortening the deadlines for new firm authorisation applications through this Bill. It is also why the Government are taking steps to establish a provisional licences regime, to reduce the barriers that firms face when seeking FCA authorisation and to help them get up and running faster. The challenges that firms face when seeking authorisation are real, and I am happy to discuss that further with the FCA, but imposing a statutory requirement on the Treasury to undertake such a review is disproportionate and not the right way to address them. As I committed to the noble Lord in our meeting prior to today, I will talk to the FCA about this and how it will ensure that this process is sped up. I fully recognise the concerns that noble Lords have raised about delays, responsiveness and the need for an approvals regime that supports growth and competitiveness. The Government are actively addressing these through the shortening of a range of statutory deadlines in the Bill, in a way that is targeted, proportionate and will ensure competitiveness without compromising the rightly high regulatory standards that firms must meet to operate in the UK. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 105.

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate and to the Minister for his response. I welcome that the Government recognise the problem of delay in authorisations and approvals. Clause 21 is clearly intended to make progress in that respect, but the existing approval figures suggest to me that the deadlines are insufficiently ambitious. Leaving it to the FCA and PRA feeds risk aversion, and it is disappointing to hear the Minister endorsing that. Unless the powers in the Bill on the Treasury and the regulators are better disciplined, we may not achieve the cultural and operational shift that firms need and we all want. There will not be an incentive for continuous improvement, of the kind that my noble friend Lord Ashcombe described in the insurance industry, that is so badly needed. I am also not sure what the unexpected circumstances are, not on stop the clock but on the basic system. What is the detail of that? Is it Covid? Is it a war? I do not know. I am grateful for the Minister’s comments on stop the clock. It was interesting to hear that nearly half the cases involved stopping the clock and that we have no idea how long the bad cases take. A statutory deadline is of limited value if it can be paused repeatedly or if firms feel that pauses are being used in a way that creates uncertainty. The FCA should, wherever possible, identify missing information early and comprehensively. I do not think I heard a satisfactory answer on that. I welcome the points raised by my noble friend Lord Holmes on all granular performance data. My noble friend Lord Howard of Rising has also raised the idea of a fast track for established senior managers, and I very much look forward to hearing the results of the Minister’s conversations with the FCA, and perhaps the PRA, on that. I am not that hopeful, and I encourage the Minister to press these issues. They matter a lot to the industry. I know, from planning and other areas that I have been involved in during my long career, that speeding things up can lead to very positive feedback. I hope the Minister will reflect further, but for now I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

My Lords, in moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment 123 in my name. As I have said before in Committee, when we have been talking about proportionality, it is at least possible to look at rules and assess whether they appear proportionate and growth-friendly, but it is far harder to understand what is happening on the ground in supervision and enforcement because that activity is not public and is, therefore, less visible. This is particularly so with Section 166 notices. I seem to have once again hit on the same subject as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I promise noble Lords that there has been no conferring, as they say on “University Challenge”. There was a time when a Section 166 notice was very rare. It was regarded as a serious matter and something you did not want others to know about, lest it suggest that you were doing something really wrong, you were in real difficulty, or you were in trouble over something. Now, the reaction is much more along the lines of, “Oh, you too?”, and the sense in the industry is that what was once a rare and targeted tool is becoming a routine, general-purpose device—sometimes even a fishing expedition. These investigations are not small matters. They can go on for a very long time. They are intrusive, expensive and disruptive to normal operations. They require the appointment of external consultants, often at significant cost, and involve a lot of staff time; they even require the hiring of additional staff to deal with keeping day-to-day activity going. In 2023-24, there were 83 Section 166 notices and in 2024-25 a further 47. The cost of them in 2024-25 was £44.7 million, which is not trivial. There is a legitimate concern that the threshold for initiating a Section 166 notice has drifted downwards, and that matters that should be dealt with through the ordinary supervisory channels are now being dealt with through Section 166. They should be dealt with routinely, using the regulator’s own knowledge and expertise wherever possible, but it seems that some of that is now being outsourced through this Section 166 route. What is needed is a pinning back to serious matters, as well as greater transparency around how and why these notices are used. My amendment aims to restore Section 166 reviews to what they were always understood to be: a tool for investigating issues that pose a serious detriment to regulatory outcomes. It would also introduce a modest reporting requirement for an annual statement setting out the number of notices issued, a breakdown by sector, the reason there was a material risk of serious detriment and the aggregate financial cost to firms. This is not an attempt to remove Section 166 or constrain the regulator’s ability to act; it is simply an attempt to ensure that a powerful and intrusive tool is used proportionately, transparently and for the purposes for which it was originally intended. Too much use is harmful, and a reputation for routine use is itself a deterrent to locating businesses in the UK. I turn to my Amendment 123, which concerns the information powers under Section 165 of FSMA. It aims to set a framework around the information demands that regulators can make. It is not intended to intrude on anything reasonably necessary for investigatory, supervisory or other statutory functions, or for advancing the regulator’s objectives. However, as the House of Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee heard in evidence, firms are receiving many requests for information that do not appear necessary or are duplicative or made without co-ordination across teams. These requests impose real cost and disruption and are not always proportionate to the matter at hand. This amendment seeks to put some structure and co-ordination around what can reasonably be expected, ensuring that information requests are targeted, necessary and proportionate, and that firms are not repeatedly asked for the same material by different parts of the same regulator. I beg to move.