Defence Readiness Bill

My Lords, I remind the House of my registered interest as chair of the National Preparedness Commission. The starting point for today’s debate is that we live in a turbulent, uncertain, volatile world. The need for the nation to be better prepared and resilient is ever more pressing. We are closer to widespread war in Europe than we have been for over 60 years. We have seen the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the routine targeting of civilian infrastructure with cheap drones and cyber attacks. But this country is already subject to hybrid and grey-zone aggression: the Salisbury poisonings, using nerve agents; arson attacks on industrial sites, Jewish premises and even properties associated with the Prime Minister; cyber attacks such as those on Marks & Spencer, the Co-op and JLR; and submarines taking an unhealthy interest in the undersea cables and pipelines on which we rely. The SDR recommended a defence readiness Bill with a framework of powers to improve the preparedness of key industries and to ensure sufficient supplies to support critical national infrastructure and the defence forces. An essential part of our commitment to Article 3 is the need to ensure continuity of government and vital services, requiring resilience against all types of shock, including natural disasters and cyber attacks, as well as military threats. A defence readiness Bill, although originally promised for early this year, was not in the King’s Speech, but my noble friend the Minister has assured us that work on it is progressing. Inevitably, legislation that codifies how to prioritise the supplies and support needed in the event of a national defence emergency is complex. The Bill must include national resilience more broadly and address what, as a nation, should be our core preparations to equip us for the acute risks contained in the published national risk register, and for the longer-term, slow-burn threats in the Government’s chronic risk analysis. So what is needed is a national resilience and defence readiness Bill, and the unfortunate delay permits that wider focus. The country’s resources may have to be mobilised not just in the event of hostilities against the nation but of other civil emergencies not necessarily arising from nation state action. Mechanisms are needed to respond to another pandemic, to extreme weather events precipitated by climate change, and so on. We know that the Swedes, like those in most other European countries, have a booklet that goes to every household, “If Crisis or War Comes”. What do we have in the UK? We have the GOV.UK Prepare website, a separate story to which I might return. The Swedes also have a booklet for companies. It recognises the decisive role of businesses in ensuring that society continues to function. Its message is: “When your company is prepared to operate under the threat of war, it is also better equipped to manage pandemics, natural disasters, and other peacetime crises”. That message should apply here: it is not just about geopolitics and the threats from Russia or wherever; it is about being ready for everything else as well. We have just seen the highest temperatures ever recorded in May, and again in June. This had consequences: the largest number of category 1 call-outs ever for the London Ambulance Service, train disruptions and IT failures. Last year’s hot temperatures saw wildfires, with the busiest night for the London Fire Brigade since the Blitz. Then there were the unprecedented 12 named storms in the 2023-24 storm season, to say nothing of West Nile virus being found in mosquitoes in Britain. What should such a national resilience and defence readiness Bill encompass? It should set the framework to enable us to make the best use of the nation’s resources in the event of hostile action—importantly, not just above but below the threshold of war. It should systemise how to maintain military and civilian reserves—I see the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, in his seat. But just as importantly, that framework should be readily activated in the event of other emergencies. Like the Climate Change Act, which has some parallel provisions, it needs to place a duty on government departments, public bodies, local authorities and large businesses and organisations to build their resilience and bolster their preparedness to respond to all sorts of threats and emergencies. Such a Bill should place reporting obligations on the Government and other agencies to report back regularly on what they are doing in respect of their resilience and preparedness. It should establish an independent, arm’s-length body, a bit like the Climate Change Committee, to monitor the adequacy of the progress made. It would, in effect, be marking the Government’s homework—which I appreciate my noble friend the Minister may not like but it is an important component. It should mark that homework to see what is being done to build the nation’s resilience and the progress being made on defence readiness and national preparedness. It would need annual reports to Parliament, and this House and the other place would need to set up committees to scrutinise progress. As the world becomes more transactional—or, dare I say it, deals-based—with increasing competition for strategic raw materials, we will need to mandate stockpiles and take action to protect our sovereign capacity in key areas. We have, after all, the most open economy among the G20. Our food supplies and our pharmaceuticals, plus key industrial materials, are imported and vulnerable to blockades and embargoes. We need to be ready for those imports to be disrupted or even shut off. In the event of conflict, we will need to be able to divert the nation’s resources to the support of our military and homeland defence. Legislation is needed to create the mechanisms to deliver the collective national endeavour needed to defend our country and make it resilient against all the other shocks that we may face. Every part of government, every part of society and every business, large and small—indeed, every one of us—have to see resilience and defence preparedness as part of their responsibilities. It must be designed in. It must be part of the national fabric. We might not have long. That is why we need the national resilience and defence readiness Bill as soon as possible. In the spirit of the outgoing Mayor of Greater Manchester’s article in today’s Times, we must deliver that “concerted action to enhance our resilience, starting at the local level”.

My Lords, it is customary to say what a pleasure it is to follow the previous speaker, and I do so with genuine enthusiasm. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, has chaired the National Preparedness Commission with great vigour, and it has produced a great deal of extraordinarily detailed and high-quality work. Much of it, it seems to me, is oven-ready for government to take on. We have a good start there, but, as the noble Lord’s own speech has pointed out, there is still an awful lot of work to do, and I have one or two questions for the Government as well. On Tuesday, there will be the Second Reading of the cyber security and resilience Bill, which is an important and necessary part of wider resilience. One might say that we have waited quite a long time for that. It does not, however, answer the question of what we mean when we talk about the whole of government, or for that matter, more ambitiously, the whole of society, which is phraseology about resilience that has taken hold in the last couple of years. There is a great question mark around what it really means. If we are going to make it mean something, it seems to me that the whole of society implies a general strengthening of the sinews of society, a lot of it physical as well as digital, and much wider participation, beyond government, with organisations and individuals involved in the development of the security itself and its maintenance. This is not virgin territory. There are models, which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has mentioned, notably in Scandinavian countries, where, among several of them, there is a form of national service of various kinds and household preparation for emergencies, including emergencies of a kind that do not necessarily involve conflict. There is extensive shelter provision in some countries. The most obvious example of that is to be found in Finland, where life for a wide segment of society can, in extremis, be maintained underground. The roots of such extensive provision lie in that country’s geography and history. I am not sure that this country would go for that. Our historical experience has been different, where our planning has largely focused on the continuity of government and essential services. However, in adopting whatever model we do, there is still much—I really do mean much—that we could learn from the Scandinavian approach. My questions for the Government are the following. What model are we going for? Do we use the phrase “whole of society”, and, when we use it, what do we mean by it? Do we have anything in our mind's eye when we use the phrase? As far as I can see, we have not done a great deal so far under the heading of resilience, beyond the sort of work that the preparedness commission has been doing, with the aim of any particular model emerging. I do not mean by that to say that we have been idle. That is not the case; as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has cited, climate work has been done, and there are other examples. But none of that has been drawn together or, as far as I can see, yet taken any legal form, nor do we have any settled machinery of government to take implementation forward. The role and organisation of the Cabinet Office and its relationship to COBRA has in recent years been altered and then changed back, while yet other forms of resilience are going to be located elsewhere. To my surprise, it is DSIT that has found itself not just promoting science, technology and innovation but responsible for ensuring secure structures for cyber in government. Dotting responsibility for security around government seems pretty odd, when it has previously had a home in the Cabinet Office. The Cabinet Office is a welcome antidote to one of the other problems that we face in the structure of our Government, which is the shortcomings that arise from the “lead government department” model. The strategic defence review specifically mentioned the need to increase the protection of our vulnerable critical national infrastructure and called for a defence readiness Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, mentioned. We need to enable the mobilisation of our reserves and our industry to war-readiness levels, but there is a problem about delay. Mr Luke Pollard, in another place, has said that the Bill will come only towards the end of this parliamentary Session, and the way he put it rather suggested to my ears that it might not come even then. I hope we can have some reassurance from the Minister. After all, NATO’s assessment is that, by 2030, Russia may decide to step up its existing level of aggression in Europe to something that is truly frightening. We need to be ready, but we are cutting it fine with all our preparations, are we not? I would say too fine. The Government talk about a national dialogue on defence, and I think this House agrees strongly with that, but they need to start ASAP. To make sense and to be clear and honest with the electorate about what they may be involved in, that needs to include aspects that come under the heading of resilience. That should include questions such as whether there is going to be some kind of national service. I come back to my questions. What are the Government going to propose to the country by way of a whole-of-society approach? What is going to be asked of us? A significant chunk of the picture still seems to be missing. In his reply, could the Minister begin to fill in some of the detail?

My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, on securing this important and timely debate and introducing it in such a persuasive way. I confess to being somewhat daunted to be following the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, whose experience is so relevant to this debate and whose speech was full of questions that need to be answered. Coming after the chairman of the National Preparedness Committee and a former Secretary of State for Security, I am a mere amateur in this area. I start from a different point of view: that of someone who has studied and been active in business. In that capacity, I have encountered many a risk register. I have noted a tendency to believe that once a risk is identified and placed on the register, it has been dealt with. In the Government’s latest incarnation of the National Risk Register, 89 specific areas of risk are identified. I wonder whether the Government are in any way confident that each of these is being addressed. In his foreword to the document, Pat McFadden—then the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who chairs the Cabinet committee on resilience—stressed the need for transparency about risks and said: “We need everyone to play their part in building resilience”. Of course, he was absolutely correct. If businesses are to be successful in navigating their way through risks, they need to involve all their people in the effort. It is no good if the chief risk officer identifies the risks and the risk committee pores over them and nods, and so it is with the country. In a company, everybody has to be involved. They have to know the risks and they have to be involved in addressing them. It is the same in the country. My concern is that the Government are failing to involve the public. Pat McFadden referred to the guidance for the public at the Government’s Prepare website; the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, made reference to it. But can the Minister tell the House how many people have visited that site? How many even know of its existence? If they were to take a look, they would find that it refers to: “Emergencies such as flooding, fires and power cuts”. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, has made the case for such risks to be integral to any national resilience plan, and he is right, but we have to stop being so squeamish about the fact that we face another increasingly real risk: war. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, who wrote the pivotal strategic defence review, spelled out the danger: “We are under-prepared. We are under-insured. We are under attack. We are not safe”. This is not an easy message to hear, but it is the truth. There should be no further delay in ensuring that the public are made fully aware of this. A national conversation or national dialogue has long been promised, but this is not the subject for a cosy fireside chat or interminable consultations. The Government need to tell the public about the risks of warfare that we now face, and ensure that people are prepared. Talking about it just does not do the job. Other countries face up to the problem. They are very effective in getting their message across without unnecessarily scaring people. Some, such as Taiwan and Finland, can see the threat because it is in such close proximity. But technology means that the enemy need not be visible. Russia has assassinated people on our soil and infiltrated our electoral process. It has made its presence well and truly felt. As the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, said, “We are not safe”. When will the Government take their responsibilities seriously, trust the public and tell them to be ready, to prepare? National resilience and defence readiness are not different things. They should be addressed together, and a joint Bill is clearly the answer. After all, how often have we seen the military called in to help in civil situations? Public involvement is crucial. Reserve forces must be recruited, volunteers lined up and trained, and businesses and the education sector brought into the effort. In Finland, senior business leaders train alongside government officials in how to build resilience and schools prepare their pupils. We shy away from being frank with our children, yet they regularly see images of war and violence. Are they supposed to think it could never happen here? Might it not be far more reassuring to be told that the threat is there but we can deal with it, and this is what you have to do to help? In a recent essay, Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper admitted that successive Governments have failed to level with the country. On defence, we have not yet had the kind of public engagement we need. Now is the time to put that right. The national resilience and defence Bill should kick off a concerted effort across the country to be prepared. Benjamin Franklin said that by failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail. He was not only a founding father of the United States but the man who invented bifocals—so a man of vision. If we have a vision of peace and security, we need to start working for it now.

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft. I was listening to her speaking about the 89 lines of the risk register. I am perhaps inspired by the fact that I was yesterday with the campaign group More Than a Score doing SATs exams. Perhaps we could set an exam for when we have a new Cabinet and Government. A couple of months afterwards, they could all sit down and do an exam on the risk register to prove that they understand it and then tell us what they are going to do about it. Like all speakers already, and no doubt all coming speakers, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Harris, for securing this debate and for the brilliant work that he and the preparedness committee do. We begin this debate in a bad position. There are many concerns about the lack of resilience and defence capacity in the UK, but I am referring to a much more specific issue—an issue for this House, this Parliament. We do not have the information we need to understand the crucial basic problem of food security, and the lack of it in the UK. I am referring to the joint intelligence chiefs’ report on the impact of nature’s collapse and food security—a problem around the world. I note that just yesterday, Mary Creagh, a Defra Minister, told MPs that a redacted 14-page version of some of the findings, published after repeated freedom of information requests in January, should provide enough information. The Cabinet Office refused to send a Minister or official to the Environmental Audit Committee to answer these questions. This is a serious cause for concern. As the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, just said, this appears to be in a context in which the Government are focused on trying not to scare people, specifically on food security. I have heard testimony from multiple experts who have been trying to get the Government to warn the public about the insecurity of our food supplies and about the need, where they can—for many, it is not financially viable—to create some private food stores and stores of fresh drinking water kept up to date. I have been asking the Government about whether they will consider holding public government stores of food. Switzerland holds three months for the whole country and is looking to go to 12. I got a very clear answer to a Written Question from the Government: “No, we are not considering that. We think the market will provide”. I am afraid that is not what the experts are saying. Like others, I do not think that keeping the public in ignorance is the way to manage this situation. That produces fear. It produces anger—something we are seeing a great deal of. Being honest and open with the public about the fact that we have a huge food security issue and need to think about changing our entire food system to tackle this, and in the meantime providing points of security along the way, is crucial.