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My Lords, these draft regulations were laid before the House on 14 May. This instrument seeks to make technical improvements and changes to the capacity market, the Government’s main tool for ensuring security of electricity supply in Great Britain. Before I turn to the provisions in detail, I will outline some of the background to the capacity market.
Great Britain’s capacity market was introduced in 2014 and is designed to maintain security of electricity supply by ensuring that sufficient electrical capacity is available to meet future demand predictions. Through auctions held annually one year and four years ahead of delivery, the capacity needed to meet future peak demand under a range of scenarios is secured based on advice from the National Energy System Operator, NESO. Participants secure agreements through these auctions, requiring them to make capacity available at times of system stress. It is a technology-neutral scheme that pays providers for making capacity available when needed, covering generation, storage, consumer-led flexibility and interconnection.
Since its introduction, the capacity market has contributed to investment in around 20 gigawatts of new capacity needed to replace older, less efficient plants as we transition to meet our clean power 2030 target. To ensure that the capacity market continues to function effectively, we regularly amend the implementing legislation based on what is required to best ensure continued security of electricity supply.
This instrument will amend 11 regulations and introduce one new regulation in the Electricity Capacity Regulations 2014, amend two regulations in the Electricity Capacity (Supplier Payment etc.) Regulations 2014 and revoke one chapter of the Electricity Capacity (No. 1) Regulations 2019. The draft instrument will ensure that assets awarded a contract for difference, or CfD, following a direction from the Secretary of State will be allowed to participate in the capacity market until the start of the asset’s CfD support. This will better align the capacity market with our clean power 2030 ambition and ensure a smooth transition from payments under the capacity market to a CfD.
This draft instrument will strengthen delivery assurance by increasing termination fees and credit cover to restore their value broadly in line with 2016 levels in real terms. It will also make several amendments and a revocation to ensure that the legislation delivers on the policy intent. As a result, the Secretary of State and NESO will have the power to extend the pre-qualification deadline for an auction following a major IT outage. It will align the capacity market timetable with the ongoing market-wide half-hourly settlement reforms. Finally, it will also remove obsolete provisions.
Two public consultations were conducted in relation to the measures in this instrument towards the end of 2025. Respondents were broadly supportive of the measures included in the instrument that clarified regulations or enabled participants awarded a direct award CfD to manage their transition off capacity market payments. Responses to the delivery assurance reforms were more mixed, with some respondents raising concerns about the impact of higher termination fees and credit cover. The Government have proceeded on the basis that these increases are necessary to realign delivery incentives and strengthen delivery assurance. The changes are proportionate, aligning fees with their real-terms equivalent values in 2016, and will apply only to participants entering the scheme after the instrument comes into force.
We have also made several technical amendments to the capacity market rules, which support the changes made by these regulations, in the form of the Capacity Market (Amendment) (No.2) Rules 2026 laid before the House on 14 May. A final set of amendments to the capacity market rules will be laid on 13 July.
To conclude, this instrument will enable the continued efficient operation of the capacity market, so that it can deliver on its objectives, improve delivery assurance and ensure that the legislation is as clear as possible for all participants. I beg to move.
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My Lords, I thank the Minister for the clarity with which the instrument was introduced. The capacity market has served us well, and we welcome this examination and updating of its functionality so that it can continue to do so long into the future.
From these Benches, the Liberal Democrats have long championed a decentralised, resilient and, above all, clean energy system. We recognise the necessity of the capacity market as a mechanism that keeps the light on during periods of high demand and low generation, and we support the broad thrust of these technical reforms. They should improve confidence that providers can deliver on their obligations, increase value for money and help to further integrate low-carbon technologies into the market. These regulations may be highly technical, but it is important that they are looked at closely, so I hope the Minister will forgive me in advance for asking a couple of technical questions from these Benches.
I welcome the Government’s intent to strengthen the delivery assurance. The 30% increase in termination fees, and in initial credit cover from £10,000 to £13,000 per megawatt, rising to £19,500 for new-build units that miss their 11th-month financial commitment milestone, is a reasonable restoration of real-terms value, given that these figures have not moved since 2016. I find it surprising that these instruments, which govern so finely balanced a market, have not been updated for over a decade. As I understand it, even with these new regulations, there is no standing process to ensure that future regular updates are in place. Were such processes contemplated and examined in the work that was done in preparing this? What guarantees do we have that we will continue to see future upgrades to this important marketplace?
The plan to suspend capacity payments the moment an insolvency termination notice is issued is good stewardship of public money, and we do not oppose it. I am, however, concerned that in seeking real-terms parity, these changes may inadvertently raise the drawbridge behind the incumbents already inside the market. A near doubling of credit cover for those who miss a milestone is a serious sum for smaller storage developers or for demand-side responses, even if it is entirely reasonable for a more established or bigger generator. What assessment has been made of the impact of these credit cover changes on the smaller and newer entrants and on the diversity of technologies bidding in future auctions?
On the new provisions in relation to severe IT issues, which would allow the delivery body to extend the pre-qualification window by up to five working days, we generally welcome this flexibility and understand why this has been updated. But what objective threshold defines “severe”? Bidders deserve certainty that such extensions will be applied consistently and transparently and that they will not be left to the delivery body’s unreviewable discretion. I am not asking the Minister to be too specific, but are these changes partly motivated by any broader concerns about the future functioning of or threats to these systems?
On the treatment of contracts for difference, the instrument will allow a generator that receives a CfD via direct Secretary of State award to pre-qualify for the capacity market, provided that there is no overlap in the delivery period, yet auction-allocated CfD holders are not afforded the same route. I ask the Minister to explain the policy rationale for that distinction and confirm that it will not in any way create a two-tier system for low-carbon generators, depending on how they come by their contracts.
On the shift to accelerated reconciliation, cutting the final settlement from 14 months to four to align with the market-wide half-hourly settlement, we support modernisation, but faster reconciliation means less time to correct errors that might have crept in. What support is being offered, particularly to smaller suppliers, which may lack the systems to absorb the increased administrative velocity?
Finally, the instrument confirms that traditional gas-fired generation continues to sit comfortably within the capacity market alongside wind, solar, storage and demand-side response. Indeed, the market remains technologically neutral. It is worth saying clearly that our systems are among the most resilient in the world and these sensible upgrades will help to keep them that way.
I remind the Minister that this instrument, as sensible as it is, is no substitute for the deeper electricity market reforms that this country still needs. We continue to urge the Government to extend contracts for difference from 15 to 25 years. I have previously talked to the Minister about Greenpeace’s Power Shift proposals and the Minister has spoken about the openness of the Government to perhaps looking at a strategic gas reserve outside of the market. Obviously, those are conversations for another day. We are beginning to see signs of the decoupling of the gas and electricity prices, but more must be done. These changes would unlock future investment in renewables, strengthen our energy security and pass on cheaper home-grown power to consumers. I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how the Government plan to keep the capacity market under review and reform it further in the future and I look forward to his response.
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My Lords, I declare my interests as chair of Amey, an infrastructure and support service company in the UK, Acteon, a global subsea engineering company with interests in offshore wind and oil and gas production facilities, and Buckthorn Partners, which invests in energy transition companies.
I am grateful to the Minister for introducing these regulations and for broadening our debate to a wider consideration of the capacity market, which allows me to make a few additional comments. As he said, these regulations make technical amendments to the capacity market, so let me address that first. They provide reliable power generators with CMU auctions at either one year, T-1, or four years, T-4, ahead of when they must deliver future electricity capacity. Does he agree that this instrument allows the capacity market delivery body to extend the window for generators to apply to pre-qualify for the capacity market in the event of a severe IT issue? I believe that he does, but I would like him to confirm that.
I ask the Minister to confirm that the changes in these regulations will not be retroactive. Again, I understand that they will not, but it would be good to have that on the record. As I read it, the instrument accelerates the timetable for reconciliation runs in which the CM settlement body must make reconciliation payments to generators, subject to Ofgem approving them to do so. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee when the new timetable is expected to be called into force.
The most recent T-1 auction for 2025-26 secured 7.9 gigawatts of capacity compared with 7.6 gigawatts in 2024. The most recent T-4 auction secured 43.1 gigawatts of capacity compared with 42.8 gigawatts in 2024. Let us be clear and blunt about this: the public are being forced to pay an extra £600 million this year to ensure that there is back-up capacity for the already more expensive renewables that they are subsidising. Conventional forms of power generation from existing generating capacity, including nuclear and gas, were the most common source of capacity in the most recent auction, with 3.6 gigawatts of capacity coming from nuclear and 2.4 gigawatts coming from gas. Electricity supply from gas and overseas interconnectors were the most common source of capacity in the most recent T-4 auction, with 27.3 gigawatts of capacity coming from gas and 6.8 gigawatts coming from interconnectors.
It is self-evident that, despite the Secretary of State’s zealous opposition to gas, this instrument demonstrates that it is still needed and demand for it is actually rising as intermittent renewables increase. It is a function of the need for firm and predictable power when the sun does not shine and the wind does not blow. When preparing last week for this important debate, I looked at our high level of reliance and dependence on gas. In our generation mix, when I looked at my watch early in the morning, we were just 19% zero carbon as the country woke to turn on the kettles and the lights and to start the day: no solar, 6% wind, 8% biomass, 12% nuclear, 15% imports and 58% gas. That is how dependent we are on gas to provide baseload power, and we will remain dependent on it for many decades to come.