Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill

My Lords, Amendment 1, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, is very simple. It seeks to confine the powers in this Bill to genuine steel businesses. Those are undertakings consisting predominantly of the manufacture or processing of steel—or iron for the purposes of steel manufacture. As drafted, the definition catches any business which merely includes steel-making as part of its operations. That is a very broad formulation. It could, in principle, sweep up a diversified business in which steel was only a minor part of what it does. Businesses with a limited connection to steel production should not face uncertainty about whether it falls within the reach of these nationalisation powers. When this point was pressed in the other place, the Secretary of State was asked whether a business with only 1% of its operations in steel would be caught by Clause 1. He did not say that it would not be. However, a statement of intent is not a limit on the face of the Bill, and future Governments are not bound by the assurances of this one. The Government say that these powers are intended for British Steel, and British Steel is obviously and predominantly a steel business. Therefore, this amendment should create no difficulty for that purpose. If the Government’s intention is genuinely not to use these powers against businesses with only a peripheral connection to steel, they should have no difficulty in accepting this amendment. I beg to move.

My Lords, I fully support this amendment and hope that it will tease out from the Minister a little more about what the underlying purpose of the general legislation is, as I am not too enamoured of this becoming a fully nationalised industry with the ability to acquire all sorts of other steel interests. I felt that the Government’s policy arose out of the circumstances of British Steel at Scunthorpe and the question of blast furnace-produced steel, where we are down to our last two blast furnaces. I did not think that the intention was to build an electric arc furnace set of businesses when progress has already been made in establishing these in the private sector and where there are plans in certain cases for government grant aid to achieve an electric arc steel additional business by that combination of subsidy assistance and private capital. I hope that the Government will accept this quite substantial narrowing of such a broad piece of legislation, because there are many with general interests in steel whom we would not like to get caught up in this. I would also like clarification on whether there is any possibility that the Government might want to build a nationalised electric arc steel set of businesses. This would be an expensive and difficult proposition.

My Lords, I thank the Minister, his team, the department and the two experts who came all the way from Coventry in 35-degree temperatures to educate the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and me on the technology of steel. It has been very co-operative and I thank them. I am slightly confused by how narrowing these words are: “of or including” versus “predominantly”. What is predominantly? Is it 60:40? Is it 55? I do not know. You have to look upon it with the body language of the Government. The Government have shown no tendency to go on a nationalisation rampage through all businesses that have ever touched a piece of steel. It is very clearly focused in one area, as the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, alluded to. Also, I remind noble Lords that there is a sunset clause in here which closes it after two years. So the talk of subsequent Governments does not have particular purchase and I am much more relaxed than the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, on this.

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their constructive engagement in advance of Committee, and for all the amendments and valuable contributions that they will make during it. Amendment 1 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, seeks to introduce a narrow definition of a “steel undertaking”. I fully understand the purpose of the amendment, but the Government have no desire for these powers to extend beyond what is necessary. They are exceptional powers for exceptional circumstances and should be exercised only where Parliament intends. I respectfully suggest that the amendment would not provide greater certainty; instead, it risks introducing greater ambiguity into the Bill. The proposed test, that a business must be “predominantly” involved in steel, immediately raises difficult questions, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on how “predominantly” is measured. Is it turnover, assets, employees, production, profit or some combination of these? The amendment provides no answer. That uncertainty would inevitably invite legal challenge, precisely when swift and decisive action may be required. Businesses with significant steel operations could argue that they fall outside the definition, because steel is not their primary activity. Equally, complex corporate structures could be organised to make the test easier to avoid altogether. In seeking to narrow the definition, the amendment risks creating loopholes that undermine the legislation’s very purpose. The Government’s drafting avoids these difficulties; it provides a clear and workable definition that gives legal certainty, while ensuring that powers are used only when genuinely needed to protect the public interest. For those reasons, while I appreciate the spirit in which the amendment was tabled, I cannot agree that it improves the Bill. I know this is not what the noble Lords intended and I can accept that the current drafting is broad, but this definition follows closely that used in the Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act and it ensures that there can be no disputes about its meaning. In practice, we do not expect many companies to fall within the current definition, so the amendment would have minimal effect. I will repeat the Government’s position expressed throughout the Bill’s passage so far: we are strongly minded to use the powers to acquire British Steel if it is in the public interest to do so, and we do not have any plans to acquire any other steel undertakings. It is therefore very unlikely that this would be used for any other company, let alone one that is engaged primarily in non-steel activity. I hope this helps clarify the matter and respectfully request that the amendment is withdrawn.

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. It was remiss of me not also to thank the Minister and his team for their extensive engagement on the Bill. This amendment is simple. I am afraid that I do not agree with the Minister’s comments or those from the noble Lord, Lord Fox. This is very straightforward. In fact, I refer noble Lords to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, which says that the word “predominantly”, in formal or technical usage, can denote a precise majority, such as more than 50%, or an even higher threshold, such as 60% to 80%, depending on jurisdiction. I am not an expert on which jurisdiction we are in, but it clearly means north of 50%. The way the Bill is written, as I pointed out, could allow for as little as 1%. I have listened to the Minister’s objections to the wording of the amendment and am very happy to work on tightening it up, if he thinks that would help. The amendment is simple: it would confine the powers in the Bill to genuine steel businesses—that is, undertakings “consisting predominantly of the manufacture or processing of steel, or iron for the purposes or in connection with the manufacture of steel”. I think that answers most of the Minister’s objections, which, frankly, if they are relevant to my wording, are also relevant to the wording currently in the Bill, so I do not really believe in the ambiguity argument. Businesses with a limited connection to steel production should not face uncertainty about whether they fall within the reach of these nationalisation powers. The present drafting does not provide that reassurance; it permits powers to apply to an undertaking that merely includes steel-making or related iron production, as I have already pointed out. I will not press the amendment for now, but I would like further discussions with the Minister, if he is amenable, to see whether we can find a way to tighten up the language so that it both suits the Government’s purposes and makes it clearer for all those undertakings that we are discussing. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 2, 3 and 8. Amendment 2 limits the public interest test to the specific factors listed in Clause 2. On first reading, the test looks robust: national security, the economy and “the construction, maintenance and operation of critical infrastructure”. These are serious criteria that one might think provide a meaningful check on the exercise of what are very significant powers. However, when one reads on, Clause 2(2) says that the test “includes (but is not limited to)” those grounds. I contend that, with those five words, the floor falls away. If the test includes but is not limited to the listed grounds, surely, in practice, there is no test at all. Any Secretary of State of any political persuasion at any time can conjure a reason and call it the public interest. The amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom would remove those words and make the listed grounds exhaustive. It would ensure that when Ministers say that these are exceptional powers subject to a robust public interest test, it is actually true—not merely true for now with this Secretary of State in these circumstances but true in the legislation for every Secretary of State who follows. The Government may say that there need to be other grounds, beyond national security, the economy and critical infrastructure. I would genuinely like to know what they are. What situation could possibly arise that those three criteria do not already cover? If the Government can answer that question, let them do so today. Let them set out on the record what additional circumstances they have in mind. If they cannot, these words should not be in the Bill. We have a Bill that, as we just discussed in the first group, can capture businesses with only a peripheral connection to steel. We now have a public interest test with no effective limit. Will the Minister confirm that the powers in the Bill cannot be triggered simply because of industrial pressure; for example, because a trade union decides that the answer to a dispute is public ownership? Will he rule that out? On Amendment 3, the Government’s impact assessment describes the difficult environment in which the steel sector operates, including high domestic operating costs and a lack of long-term investment. It recognises that these pressures bear directly on the ability of UK steel producers to compete. Yet Clause 2 refers only in the broadest terms to “supporting the economy”. That phrase could cover almost any intervention; it does not require Ministers to demonstrate that the intervention will leave the United Kingdom with a stronger, more productive or more internationally competitive steel sector. There is a difference between preserving an undertaking for the moment and putting it on a sustainable footing for the future. Nationalisation may avert an immediate crisis, but it should not become a means simply of transferring losses, risks and difficult decisions from a company to the taxpayer. The question must be whether public ownership can help to secure the investment, modernisation, productivity and commercial resilience needed for this sector to compete successfully. There is also a point of consistency with the Government’s own drafting. The Bill makes clear that the public interest test is not intended to be limited to the matters specifically listed. It says that the test includes but is not limited to national security, critical infrastructure and the economy, as I said earlier, so the Government have already chosen not to confine the public interest test. In those circumstances, why would they resist including economic growth and international competitiveness expressly within it? Growth is the Government’s stated number one priority. International competitiveness is plainly fundamental to the future of a sector exposed to intense overseas competition and high energy costs. If the Government consider national security and critical infrastructure important enough to name in the Bill, surely growth and competitiveness should also be named. I invite the Minister to explain why those two objectives do not appear in the Bill. How will the Government assess whether an intervention is likely to strengthen competitiveness? Will that assessment include energy costs, investment, productivity, output, technological modernisation, export potential and the undertaking’s ability to operate sustainably without indefinite support from the taxpayer? On Amendment 8, the Government have confirmed that they have already provided approximately £555 million to British Steel for working capital, including raw materials and salaries. The National Audit Office reported that, as at 31 January this year, the Department for Business and Trade had spent £377 million on its intervention. At the then current rate of spending, total costs were expected to exceed £642 million by the end of this month. More importantly, the National Audit Office warned that if spending continued at the then current rate, costs could exceed £1.5 billion by 2028—and that figure was before any potential transformation of the business, compensation to the current owner or the eventual costs of exit. The NAO also found that the intervention has “no clear end date … has not stabilised the company’s finances” and began “without a clear exit strategy”. This Bill is not simply emergency legislation to keep the furnaces operating over a weekend. It creates enduring powers to transfer businesses, assets, rights and liabilities into public ownership. Before those powers are exercised, the Government must be able to demonstrate that the proposed course represents value for money. The facts since the emergency intervention underline why this matters. We are told that the business in its present form is structurally unprofitable. We know that substantial decisions remain to be made on its future, including any transition in production technology, the cost of investment, the length of any transition period and the eventual route to a viable and sustainable business. The taxpayer needs protection against an open-ended commitment. The Government may argue that the Treasury’s Managing Public Money framework already requires departments to consider value for money. I suppose I could look forward to the day when there is some evidence of the Treasury acting responsibly in this way. Can the Minister tell us what value-for-money assessment will be undertaken before a principal transfer power is exercised? Will it include the expected costs of compensation, operating losses, capital investment, decommissioning, restructuring and any eventual exit? This amendment would not frustrate the Government’s ability to act where action is genuinely justified. It would simply ensure that before nationalisation takes place, the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is a responsible use of taxpayers’ money. I beg to move.

My Lords, Amendment 2 would replace “includes (but is not limited to)” with the word “means” so that we knew what we were describing. The worry is that leaving it as it is could create a public interest so large that there was a mission creep that I do not think should be in the Bill, which is trying to nationalise steel. We need to be slightly more economical in the words we are using, so that we need not fear that on another day, if another public interest was being taken into account, the definition would prove far too loose. The word “means” does the job: we know exactly what one is talking about, and it lists the three elements. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, wanted to include two other areas but, for me, limiting it to those three objects seems to be where we should stop. The word “means” would stop mission creep.

My Lords, I welcome these three amendments. Amendment 2 is a necessary slight curtailment but would still leave the Government with enormous scope, given how wide-ranging the three cited reasons for public interest intervention are. Like my noble friend, I cannot think of any other reason why they might want to do this that could not be adequately covered by the wide-ranging proposals in the existing text. I agree that it would be a good idea to change the language through Amendment 3 to stress that intervention should, in the longer term, be interested in economic growth, profitability and successful investment. Surely the Government do not want a lame-duck investment that costs a large sum of money for a limited period of time but then they have to disappoint all those people who thought that it was going to be kept going for a rather longer period or that it might break through to profitability and success. If I had to choose between the three amendments, I hope my noble friend would particularly press Amendment 8 on value for money, which sums it all up. At Second Reading, in looking at the general legislation, we had some discussions asking: what is the medium and longer-term future of blast furnace steel? As I think we have agreed across the House, at Second Reading and now, the main reason for the previous emergency legislation and this legislation is the temporary cessation of closure of two very important blast furnaces, which are our last blast furnace-making capabilities in the country. But I believe—I would love to have the Government either confirm or deny this—that it is still their medium to longer-term intention to close all blast furnaces in this country, as previous Governments have been doing, and to transfer to electric arc steel-making, preferably with private finance and successful competitive private sector businesses doing that work. In the previous exchanges, I think the Minister signalled that the Government do not wish to build a nationalised electric arc business with these powers, although for understandable reasons they have to be general and will most likely be exercised in the case of the blast furnaces. It would be helpful to workers and taxpayers if there were greater clarity over the time period for keeping these blast furnaces open, and whether there are any limits on the costs that the Government are prepared to run, so that people can make proper plans concerning their jobs and their futures in this important steel industry, and so that taxpayers could have some reassurance.

My Lords, one of the things that the briefing from the high value catapult team confirmed is the enormous difficulty there will be in creating a viable business from what His Majesty’s Government intend to take control of in Scunthorpe. There is the age of its blast furnace, the potential cost of any replacement of a blast furnace, the expense of conversion to an electric arc furnace—if that is what is intended—and the hugely competitive landscape of the global steel markets. These are just the headlines of the complexity, but the choices go beyond blast furnace or arc furnace. If investment is found to install a new electric arc furnace, what will it produce? Will it aim to produce the full range of steels that we need—longs, flats, rebar—or will it specialise in particular steels that perhaps are more strategic and less easy to source? If it goes down the specialisation route, the UK will probably need access to much more direct reduced iron, or DRI. It is likely that this would have to be imported, and these would be very high CO 2 emission imports from most countries, because making our own DRI would need a whole new bit of kit which is very pricey. Choices and making the right calls will determine whether Scunthorpe has a long-term future and what that future looks like. It will determine whether it is indeed an investable prospect and whether it can attract the private sector. When the Government begin—assuming this Bill becomes an Act—to use the terms of the Act to take ownership of this plant, that will change the focus of these choices. Of course, there will be a new board and management to run the plant, but the cost of the choices will rest with UK taxpayers, at least at first. We will be providing the capital. As we have heard, we have already made available £555 million in working capital, but clearly these sums could increase massively at scale. It is the scale of risk that the Government are taking on that is guiding my approach and our approach, because this Bill needs more scrutiny from Parliament at all levels. From these Benches, we will be pushing those buttons. These three amendments start at least to open up that point around accountability. I am a bit intrigued because while I do not always agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, he is normally internally consistent. However, the noble Lord started out by saying there should be no expansion of the terms of Clause 2 and then put forward two pretty reasonable ones about growth and expanding the economy. I have one that I think the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, would agree with, which is cost. We should have a clear understanding of the cost before the public interest test. I completely disagree with Amendment 2 because there needs to be a broader discussion around “public interest”. We need to understand the numbers around it, otherwise we do not know whether it is interesting to the public. I do not agree with Amendment 2. I have some sympathy with the other two amendments, and I am sure we will talk more about public interest tests as we deal with other groups.