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My Lords, these draft regulations were laid before the House on 23 April 2026. I want to briefly outline the purpose of nuclear safeguards and explain the proposed amendments to the nuclear safeguards regulations. These regulations form the foundation of the UK’s civil nuclear safeguards regime, enabling us to meet our international obligations. These amendments are designed to refine and strengthen the UK’s system.
Nuclear safeguards are a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. They are accounting, reporting and verification processes that demonstrate that nuclear material and facilities are not being diverted for military use. Safeguards are how we show the International Atomic Energy Agency and the international community that civil nuclear material is being used as it should be and is not being diverted into military programmes. The safeguards system is also central to building confidence for international nuclear trade and co-operation. These are distinct from nuclear safety and security but, of course, they are just as vital.
For almost 50 years, the UK has committed to meeting our international obligations and supporting the international nuclear safeguards regime. A strong, well-functioning regime sends a clear message that the UK takes its responsibility as a nuclear state seriously. Our current safeguards regime has been in place since the UK left the European Atomic Energy Community, Euratom, in 2020. It was designed to be equivalent in effectiveness to the previous regime. The Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 set out operator requirements and conferred functions on the Office for Nuclear Regulation as the UK’s safeguards regulator.
The amendments we are considering are about improving how that regime works. The proposed amendments are drawn from a statutory post-implementation review carried out in 2023 and then a public consultation on the proposed amendments in 2025. There are three broad categories of amendments, which I will cover briefly in turn. The first covers the proposed removal of provisions related to the transition to the ONR-led regime or those that do not apply to the UK’s operational context. Their removal simplifies and brings greater clarity to the regulations.
The second and largest set of changes is about improving operability and clarifying requirements. The main change in this category is the move to using the IAEA design information questionnaires. Up until now, the UK continued to use Euratom’s design information reporting format, and we are moving to the IAEA format instead. This change will align the UK internationally and support our civil nuclear sector’s international partnerships.
We are also changing some timelines for submitting information to the ONR, including some reduction in the timelines for operators. For example, we are changing the timelines for submitting design information to the ONR. The UK is required to submit design information to the IAEA within 30 days. Under the current regulations, the entirety of the 30 days sits with the operators. By dividing the timeline to 23 days for operators and seven for ONR, the majority of time remains with the operators while the regulator now has five working days for its activities to meet the requirements. We are also updating some definitions so that they keep the UK aligned internationally.
The final set of changes is smaller but important for making sure the regulations are fit for purpose. This includes provisions for offences, where relevant, as an established final point of escalation. The Nuclear Safeguards (Fees) Regulations will also be updated to reflect ONR activities added to NSR 19, and we expect these costs to be minimal.
In conclusion, these amendments will strengthen the Nuclear Safeguards Regulations. This will enable a more efficient and effective delivery of the domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime, ensuring that we continue to meet our international obligations. At the same time, the changes will support our nuclear industry in its trade and operational activities, both of which, of course, are vital to our country’s economic growth and energy security. I look forward to hearing what noble Lords say about the proposed detail.
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My Lords, I thank the Minister for setting out the purpose of these regulations. Nuclear safeguards and the system for reporting, inspection and verification gives the International Atomic Energy Agency and the wider world the confidence that our civil nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes and is not being diverted into weapons programmes. Without a credible safeguards regime, we cannot trade in civil nuclear material, operate our existing plants or attract the international partners on whom our nuclear ambitions depend.
The 2019 regulations established our domestic regime post Brexit. This instrument, some seven years on, does several things. It removes transitional provisions that were only ever intended to smooth the exit from Euratom; tightens and clarifies the language operators must work within; introduces new offences to plug enforcement gaps; adjusts reporting timelines to give the Office for Nuclear Regulation more time to scrutinise what it receives; and, most significantly for our international standing, transitions the UK from Euratom-style basic technical characteristic questionnaires to the IAEA’s own design information questionnaire format. It also amends the associated fees regulations to put the ONR’s cost recovery on a clearer statutory footing.
On these Benches, we recognise this as an essential and overdue update to a globally recognised regulatory system, and we support it. We particularly welcome the removal of the Euratom transition provisions and the move to the IAEA’s design information questionnaire format as a sensible step forward towards international harmonisation that will ease collaboration with our partners and materially support the UK, US and global civil industry partnerships.
Our support, however, should not be mistaken for uncritical or entirely enthusiastic support for the wider nuclear policy: we continue to have some concerns about the delivery of large-scale plants. We recognise that nuclear is obviously a crucial part of our energy mix, and we are supportive of the move towards more small modular reactors.
On the detail, I apologise, as I have several questions for the Minister. On the new offences, these regulations introduce criminal liability for non-compliance with particular safeguards provisions and for the failure to declare a change in facility type—corrections to an oversight in the original 2019 regulations. I just want to ask the Minister about this gap, which feels significant in our enforcement regime and why it was allowed to persist for seven years before being addressed here. I further seek assurance that the ONR now has everything that it needs as both legal powers and operational capacity to pursue enforcement action all the way to prosecution, where the gravity of a breach demands it.
On reporting timescales, the Minister has set out the window for operators to declare design information changes, but can he confirm that this tighter window will not place a disproportionate burden on the more than 130 qualifying facilities with limited operations? As he is well aware, we are talking about smaller-scale universities and corporate operations.
On the transition to the new IAEA forms, I welcome the Government’s decision, following consultation feedback, to extend the transition period for adopting the design information questionnaire from two years to three.
I feel that one question did not get sufficient attention in the other place. Are there specific risks during the migration and transition? Moving from one accountancy and control system to another is not just an exercise done on paper. There is a period during any transition when records may exist in two formats simultaneously, when staff are learning new systems and when the potential for gaps or miscategorisation is at its highest. We will also see some new definitions from the SI. What specific guidance will the ONR provide to operators to ensure that no accounting anomalies fall between the two systems and that the integrity of our nuclear accounting records is maintained throughout what will be a difficult transition period?
On record-keeping, this instrument extends the retention period for operating and accounting records from five years to 30. That is a big change. I notice that the costs in the supporting documents were quite low, but keeping computer records for that long is quite a complicated exercise, as computers become obsolete. Is that not putting on too much of a burden? Will the Minister say something about extending computer record-keeping and its security over that long period of time?
Finally, on repurposed facilities, the instrument introduces requirements for operators to notify the ONR 200 days before a change of facility type. Given the Government’s policy ambition to rapidly deploy small modular reactors, are they certain that these regulatory time changes are flexible enough not to impact the rollout and operation of small modular reactors?
We support this instrument. It will strengthen our safeguards regime, bring us more closely into step with our international partners and help guard against the unlawful diversion of civil nuclear material, so we fully support it.
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My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for coming to the Committee to introduce these regulations. I am particularly pleased to be opposite him for the first time on these issues. I hope we will have many similar exchanges in the years to come. I am glad to say that, on this occasion, we are in agreement. There is little I can add to the excellent contribution of the noble Earl, Lord Russell.
A strong, independent nuclear safeguards regime is vital for our civil nuclear industry to function effectively. However, the Government must support nuclear site operators and other nuclear industry partners to ensure that they are not placing unworkable burdens on the nuclear industry. As the Minister said in his introduction, the instrument will implement most of the recommendations from the post-implementation review in 2019, so it is largely Conservative Party policy.
The Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 are the current regime used to demonstrate that civil nuclear material is not unlawfully diverted into military use. Also relevant are the Nuclear Safeguards (Fees) Regulations 2021, which regulate the fees payable by operators to the Office for Nuclear Regulation—ONR. This instrument will amend both to remove regulations related to the transition from Euratom, as both previous speakers have said, which are no longer applicable or do not apply to the UK context. We agree with that.
A new offence corrects an oversight, when the NSR 19 was originally implemented, relating to non-compliance with the requirements of the particular safeguards provisions. We also support that. An offence has been added related to non-compliance, with a new provision requiring operators to declare to ONR where there is a change in the type of facility. It also ensures that the regulator has a sanctions regime for non-compliance.
The main change, as the Minister made clear to the Committee, is to replace Euratom’s basic technical characteristics—BTC—questionnaire, which assesses how nuclear site operators account for their nuclear material, with the IAEA’s design information questionnaire, or DIQ. It also reduces the design information changes reporting time, as the Minister stated, from 30 to 23 days. He also stated that it requires operators to give the ONR more notice of imports, from four to seven days, and of exports, I believe from seven to 13 days. I may have missed that in the Minister’s comments, but I understand that that is the case.
It was interesting to see concerns over some of the changes made by nuclear site operators and other nuclear industry parties who were consulted. This includes changes to notification timings for the import and export of nuclear material, with operators questioning why the ONR needed more time to report this information to the IAEA, and the adequate number of staff needed to fulfil accountancy and control plans for nuclear material, with operators concerned that this was not clear enough, having previously questioned the rationale for the plans. Maybe the Minister will be able to comment on that.
In summary, the impact of the costs on business will be about £200,000 to £300,000. The transition period for changing forms from BTCs to DIQs was lengthened, with the ONR still accepting BTCs for the first year and DIQs for the second year. The notification timings for reporting design change, imports and exports were also amended to give operators more time than originally proposed, while still increasing the time the regulator has to quality assure. This instrument introduces changes largely supported by the consultees and initiated by the previous Government, as I mentioned. Therefore, we thank the Minister and are supportive of the proposals he brought before the Committee.
I have a question related to his portfolio. Events of recent days have suggested that the energy Bill may be delayed. I do not imagine that the Minister can possibly comment on that, but I suggest to him that that would be regrettable because the Fingleton recommendations are really important. It would be helpful to the Committee if he could comment on that, if he is in a position to. I am grateful to the Minister and conclude by reinforcing my support for the recommendations he brought forward.
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I thank the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, for the support and the useful additional questions. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, for his wish to be opposite me for a long time. I cannot make any guarantees on that.
I agree with some of the points made, which largely support what I said. As I said, these amendments strengthen our position and make things easier. They will support trade and operations that are central to the sector’s work. The noble Earl, Lord Russell, asked why there is a gap in closing the offences part. The answer is that a statutory instrument was needed to do that, and this is a statutory instrument to achieve that. It is important that we are now closing those gaps. These amendments remove what has been a long transition agreement that really is not needed any more, given where we are domestically. The industry has largely welcomed this.
By bringing our design reporting requirements in line with those of the IAEA, we will make it simpler for both domestic and international new entrants to the market. That includes, on the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, the SMRs, which are crucially important for where we go next.
The noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, raised operator concerns. There is no doubt that the operators expressed some concerns about the move, for example, to use the IAEA questionnaire so quickly. We listened to that and introduced a longer transition period, to give them a chance to familiarise themselves with the process and to develop the new reporting format. Importantly, the ONR will work very closely with them to facilitate that change. It now has a year of the old system and then two years to make the transition.
Similarly, when operators noted concern about the timelines for reporting—an important point that both noble Lords picked up—there was no time allocated to the ONR. Strictly speaking, the operators could go right the way up to day 30 and hand the information over to the ONR. It then had to get it in by day 30, otherwise it was in breach of our international obligations. Initially, the proposal was to give half and half. We listened to the concerns and changed it so that the ONR will take five working days and the operators have the rest. That is an appropriate and proportionate response to the concerns.
It is particularly important that, as a nuclear weapons state, we demonstrate that we are complying with these safeguards and do not have any mechanism to divert civil nuclear material for military use. This will strengthen our ability to do so. In making these safeguards, we will encourage other states to follow suit, which will support the wider non-proliferation regime.
Two extra questions were asked. On the question about the SMR rollout, which I have partially answered, I can absolutely reassure the noble Earl, Lord Russell, that it is a high priority for us to get that moving. I do not believe that what is in here in any way impedes our ability to do that quickly. That leads on to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, raised about what we are doing on the Fingleton review. That legislation will be introduced in this parliamentary Session. We are committed to try to drive the Fingleton recommendations through to completion by the end of next year, as we said when they were first introduced.
I hope that answers the questions that noble Lords have raised and that I have provided the necessary assurances to allow them to approve the regulations before us today.