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My Lords, it is my pleasure to open the debate on what is a vital Bill. I will start with the importance of the Bill and what it will achieve. I am pleased to have had an opportunity to discuss the content, direction and purpose of the Bill with a number of noble Lords outside the Chamber, and I am happy to have further discussions between now and later stages next week if Members so wish.
State threats are overt or covert actions by foreign Governments that fall below armed conflict but go beyond legitimate diplomacy to harm UK interests. They present a persistent and evolving risk to the United Kingdom and our allies, manifesting across a wide spectrum of activity, including interference in democratic processes, acquisition of sensitive information, threats to public safety, and disruption of economic security. Noble Lords will know that certain states have both the intent and the capability to conduct such activity to advance their objectives. This activity is often opportunistic, adaptive, increasingly integrated across multiple domains, and combining physical, cyber, economic and information tools. The threats are both evolving and enduring, and our legislation must keep pace.
In December 2024, the former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, commissioned Jonathan Hall KC, in his capacity as the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, to conduct a review into the tools available in terrorism legislation and how they may be applied to the problem of state threats. I place on record, on behalf of this House, our thanks to Jonathan Hall KC for his work. He proposed that we should legislate to create a state threats power equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. Noble Lords will be aware of those powers as we have, within the last year, designated a number of organisations under that Act. This Bill delivers on that proposal and will strengthen the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counterterrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK.
The Bill will create a new power for the Secretary of State, in this case the Home Secretary, to designate organisations involved in foreign power threat activity, modelled on proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. It introduces new criminal offences of supporting, assisting or obtaining benefits from designated bodies and will enable proxy organisations to be treated, in practice, like foreign intelligence services, making it easier to prosecute those acting on their behalf.
The Bill will strengthen the overall national security framework, so that the United Kingdom becomes a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services and those state-linked proxies. Individuals acting for a designated body will feel the full force of our national security legislation and the accompanying offences, some of which will carry a life sentence. Designation will send a clear public signal to designated bodies that those prepared to assist them in their malign behaviour will not be tolerated.
In developing this legislation, we have worked closely with the police and the security and intelligence agencies. It has been a year in gestation, and I know from Question Time, Statements and elsewhere that noble Lords feel that that has been too long, but this is vital legislation and it is important to get it right. The Bill gives our operational partners the powers they need, and it does so in a way that reflects the differences between state and non-state actors. Jonathan Hall himself has said of the Bill, “It does the job”.
The Bill has come to us today from the House of Commons, where I know there was debate regarding some of its provisions. I will, if I may, use this Second Reading opening speech to address why I think the Bill is the right thing to do, and to address some of the comments around the Bill as a whole. There was debate in the House of Commons regarding possible amendments to the Bill. I assure people across this House that such amendments are not necessary and that the Bill as drafted does the job required. If the Government are to exercise the powers in the Bill promptly, a swift but thoroughly scrutinised passage through this House will, I suggest, prove beneficial. I will provide noble Lords with reassurances today to enable that passage to take place.
I particularly want to address three points in the Bill as currently drafted. The first is the prohibited purpose test, which is applied to the support offence in Clause 2. The Bill makes it an offence to express support for a designated body, including by arranging a meeting to be addressed by a member of a designated body, when that support is for a prohibited purpose. Clause 2 goes on to define a prohibited purpose as a purpose that
“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
We have had some comment on that from Members, both in discussions I have had and in the House of Commons. There have been suggestions that the prohibited purpose test should be removed from the Bill on the basis that no such test applies to the support offences in the Terrorism Act. I suggest that is to misunderstand the differences between state entities and terror organisations. While proscription under the Terrorism Act aims to ban the existence of an organisation, that cannot and must not be the case with this Bill. Even when a state entity presents a threat to the UK, there will still be cases in which there are legitimate reasons for engaging with that entity. Indeed, such engagement will often be in the UK’s interests as a whole, through British diplomats or NGOs doing vital work on conflict resolution or to deliver humanitarian aid. To remove the prohibited purpose test would be to criminalise such activity.
Secondly, there has also been some discussion that the Bill does not go far enough to criminalise individuals who provide assistance to designated bodies in relation to overseas activities. New Section 17B makes it an offence to provide such assistance when the activity undertaken is
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
Although there has been discussion on this both in the House of Commons and in formal discussions I have had, it will mean that an individual in the UK who assists a designated body in hostile activity towards an ally, with a recognisable adverse effect on the UK, would be committing a crime under the Bill.
The Bill does not extend the UK’s criminal jurisdiction over all other acts anywhere in the world, irrespective of whether they affect the UK. It is an important principle of international law that there are reasonable limits to that jurisdiction, but where activities are contrary to our interests, this offence will bite. It is in line with the equivalent offences in the National Security Act. If we were to go further, we would not only go beyond what our operational partners have asked for; we would also push the limits of international law. I suggest that the Bill has the balance right on this issue.
Thirdly, there has been some comment and discussion in Parliament, and outside, in relation to the debate on so-called self-directed acts—that is to say, acts that are inspired by state threat actors but not directed by them. I assure noble Lords that such acts are caught within the offences in the Bill. Specifically, the offence at new Section 17B of providing material assistance to a designated body requires that a person intends their actions to assist that body. They do not have to be tasked or directed by the body for which they are working for the offence to apply.
New Section 33B also introduces the designated body condition to the National Security Act. This means that when a person acts with the intention to benefit a designated body, they may also engage the offences under that Act. This includes offences such as obtaining or disclosing protected information and sabotage, which both carry life sentences. Again, this does not need any tasking from the designated body. I hope that addresses noble Lords’ concerns and removes any doubt in their minds.
There has been considerable discussion on specific bodies that might or might not be designated under this Bill. I noticed an amendment in the House of Commons to proscribe the IRGC directly, and I have experienced a lot of pressure about that in this House as well. There have been calls for the Government to commit to designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. I hope I can explain to noble Lords that while this Bill is being discussed, I cannot give that commitment today. The powers in the Bill are vital; their exercise will have profound implications for the UK’s foreign policy and our national security. It is right that Parliament should set the legal framework for the use of those powers and will be asked to endorse their use through the affirmative procedure, as the Bill provides. It is also right that it should be for the Secretary of State, on the advice of expert evidence, and in some cases sensitive intelligence, to determine whether the use of these powers is necessary.
I will not today pre-empt decisions that have yet to be taken in relation to a law that has yet to be passed. But I give the House a cast-iron assurance that where the Secretary of State judges it necessary, she will use these powers, if they receive Royal Assent, and she will not hesitate to do so. I am confident that noble Lords will hold me to account on that point. The sooner the Bill is on the statute book, the sooner the powers within it can be used. The Bill remains a vehicle for the Home Secretary to determine whether a state threat designation is required on any body post Royal Assent.
We have had some discussion in Parliament around the speed on this. The Government are committed to a fast track on the Bill. That commitment reflects the urgent need to close a legislative gap. It also reflects the interest in this House and in our society in ensuring that government has the powers to deal with those state entities that threaten our national security. It was in response to a series of heinous antisemitic arson attacks in north London that the Prime Minister committed to bringing the Bill forward within weeks. We put it in the gracious Speech in May and brought it forward in both Houses at the earliest opportunity. I want to see it passed by both Houses at the earliest opportunity, so that we can get on with examining the requirements of using these powers as appropriate.
In our manifesto, we committed to take the approach used to deal with terrorism and to adapt it to deal with state-based security threats. The Bill does just that and fulfils a manifesto commitment. Ultimately, at stake is the purpose we are all sent here to advance, the most important thing we can do as a Government and a Parliament: to ensure the security of our nation and all who live in it.
I pay tribute to the men and women of our police and security services. Their work could not matter more, particularly at this dangerous time. As well as thanking them, we must support them to tackle the threats we face in a dangerous and uncertain world. To give that support, we need to equip them with the new and necessary powers in this legislation.
There is a wealth of experience across this House. I look forward to the further scrutiny that noble Lords will provide both today and next week, if the Bill is read a second time. We have a strong list of speakers today who will provide that fruitful debate. I suggest to the House that the urgency of our national security demands that the Bill be passed, giving the Home Secretary the powers to make assessments and use these powers at the earliest opportunity, where those threats exist. I beg to move.
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My Lords, I begin by welcoming at long last the Government’s decision to bring this legislation forward. I say “at long last” advisedly and not as mere partisan point-scoring. This House will recall that the Opposition pressed the Government on no fewer than three separate occasions during the passage of the Crime and Policing Act in the previous Session to proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On three occasions, the House voted in favour of our amendments; on three occasions, the Government voted against them. Ministers resisted, delayed and demurred until, ultimately, the weight of public pressure, the urging of the Jewish community and the reality of what is happening on our streets became impossible to ignore. The Prime Minister made his announcement and here we are.
We do not begrudge the Government their change of position; we welcome it. The direction of travel is right, and this side of the House wants to see the Bill pass. But the circumstances of its arrival matter, because they help explain the deficiencies in the Bill as drafted. This legislation draws directly from the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, whose report was published 14 months ago. Yet we are now told that this is so urgent that the Government will not consider any amendments, which is highly disappointing, given that the Bill before us today contains gaps that, if not rectified, risk rendering its central purpose unenforceable—I will come to those in a moment.
We must be frank about the threat we face. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a distinct threat. It is an organisation that has been active on British soil, targeting British citizens and funding terrorism across the world. In October 2024, Ken McCallum, the director-general of the Security Service, said that MI5 and the police had responded to 20 Iran-backed plots since January 2022 involving
“potentially lethal threats to British citizens”.
In May 2025, three Iranian men were charged under the National Security Act after a major counterterrorism investigation, and prosecutors said that one of the men had carried out surveillance, reconnaissance and online research with the aim of committing serious violence against a person in Britain. In March this year, we saw the horrific arson attack on Jewish ambulances in Golders Green, responsibility for which was claimed by an Iran-aligned group.
The IRGC funnels billions of dollars to terrorist proxies worldwide. It gifts rockets and advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. It manages thousands of fighters operating across multiple continents. It co-ordinates assassinations, kidnappings and sabotage operations, including here in the United Kingdom. Therefore, it is entirely right that the law should treat association with, and support for, the IRGC as a criminal matter. That is what this Bill sets out to do and why we support its intentions.
However, good intentions poorly executed create only the illusion of security. I must be candid with the House: as drafted, the Bill contains at least four significant vulnerabilities that we believe must be addressed before it leaves this place. The first is the “prohibited purpose” requirement. The provisions in Clause 2 are modelled on Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the provision that makes it an offence to invite support for a proscribed terrorist organisation. However, the Government have introduced an additional element that does not appear in the Terrorism Act: a requirement that the support be given for a “prohibited purpose”, which is defined as conduct that is
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
I ask the Minister a simple question that I hope he will answer directly: what form of support for the IRGC do the Government consider to be beneficial to the United Kingdom? What type of assistance to the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism could possibly be regarded as in our national interests? If the answer is none—as it self-evidently must be—then why does this additional evidential standard exist at all?
What this provision creates in practice is a perverse hierarchy of culpability. Under the Bill, a prosecution against an individual for supporting the IRGC would require proof that their support was prejudicial to the United Kingdom. However, if that same individual were supporting one of the IRGC’s terrorist proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—they would face a lower bar to prosecution under existing terrorism legislation. The organisation responsible for inspiring, organising, arming and financing those groups would receive greater legal protection than the groups themselves. That cannot be the Government’s intention. I hope that the Minister will listen and bring his own amendment to this effect; if not, I most certainly will.
The second concern relates to an omission of provisions on uniforms and insignia. Under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, it is an offence to display in a public place
“an item of clothing, or … any other article, in such a way … as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”.
It is also an offence to publish an “image” of such an article or item of clothing. That is the provision used to remove Hamas flags from our streets and to seize Hezbollah insignia. The Bill contains no equivalent provision whatever. If the IRGC is designated under this legislation, its symbols, insignia and flags could be displayed openly in public with complete legal impunity. There is a gap in the legislation that is so obvious and damaging to public confidence that its presence in the Bill is difficult to explain.
I believe that the Government are of the view that this would somehow be inappropriate for this legislation. I wholly disagree. The Bill applies only to a UK person. We are not trying to ban Iranians displaying such insignia in Iran—of course we cannot do that—but why should anyone in the United Kingdom be permitted to wave the flag or wear the uniform of an organisation that we have deemed to be a threat worthy of designation under this legislation?
The third gap relates to the dissemination of publications and materials. Since 2006, it has been an offence under the Terrorism Act to disseminate terrorist publications. These are publications that encourage, glorify or provide practical assistance for acts of terrorism. That standard has been part of our counterterrorism framework for nearly two decades. This Bill makes no equivalent provision for designated hostile state bodies. Materials promoting, glorifying or facilitating the activities of designated groups could be distributed without triggering criminal liability. This is not a minor technical omission; it is a failure to apply a basic and well-established standard of counterterrorism law to a new category of threat.
The fourth and final concern is the absence of a preparatory conduct offence. The Bill as drafted captures those who assist, support or receive money from a designated group; it does not capture those who are in the process of planning to do so. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 addresses this gap in the terrorism context, making it clear that preparation for terrorist action is itself an offence. By the time someone has completed an act of support for a terrorist organisation, the damage may already be done. Catching people in the preparatory stages is operationally essential for our security services. As the Bill stands, an individual who has taken concrete steps towards assisting the IRGC cannot be prosecuted unless and until the act itself is complete. They cannot be prosecuted for those acts because preparatory acts are not covered by any of offences in the Bill. That is a vulnerability that we do not have in our terrorism legislation. It is a vulnerability we should not introduce here.
I will make one final point. I have read Hansard and looked at the response from the new Security Minister to my honourable friend Alicia Kearns in the other place, and I must say that I found it wanting. The Security Minister said:
“There are a couple of themes that run through my response to the hon. Lady’s amendments. The first is that it is not possible to treat a state body the same as a terrorist organisation, because one cannot abolish a state body ”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/26; col. 922.]
This argument does not stand. Proscription does not abolish a terrorist group. Hamas is a proscribed group of the United Kingdom, yet we all know it still exists in the Middle East. Daesh was not defeated because the British Government had proscribed it. Would anyone argue that Palestine Action does not exist now that it has been proscribed?
The purpose of proscription is not to abolish a group but to degrade its ability to operate in the United Kingdom by prohibiting all forms of association with and support for it. That is precisely what the Government say they intend to do with designation under this Bill. Therefore, the reality is that proscription and designation are not really as different as the Minister would have us believe. Given that was the Government’s main justification for rejecting my honourable friend’s amendments last week, I hope they will rethink their objections.
The rushed nature of the Bill’s drafting is, I regret to say, visible in the legislation. When a Government spend months resisting legislation, then reverse course under political pressure and move quickly to announce a Bill, the risk of corners being cut is very real. We see the evidence of that here. None of our concerns is insurmountable. In each case, the amendments would bring this legislation into conformity with the counterterrorism framework it is explicitly based on.
As I have just outlined, there is no reason why this should not happen. The threat from the IRGC—and, indeed, other state-linked groups—is present, documented and ongoing. The House has an obligation to ensure that when legislation is passed in response to that threat, it is legislation that works, is watertight and enforceable, and does not permit those who support one of the world’s most dangerous organisations to slip through its gaps. We support the Bill. We want to see it on our statute book, but we will not allow the urgency of the cause to excuse the inadequacy of the drafting. We will table amendments in Committee and we look forward to constructive engagement with Ministers.
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My Lords, the Liberal Democrats support the principles of the Bill. We have been clear that we also want this legislation on the statute book and we will not seek to hold it up. We fully recognise the unprecedented security challenges that we face, confronting more serious and less predictable threats than at any time since the Cold War. In 2025 alone, MI5 reported a 35% increase in state threat activity on the previous year, including more than 20 Iran-backed plots to kidnap or kill on British soil. We are in accord with the Government. This activity must be stopped.
However, while we will not obstruct the Bill, our support is not a blank cheque for lawmaking. The Bill was introduced just 13 days ago and was rushed through the other place in less than six hours. That begs the question: why did it take 14 months to act on recommendations from Jonathan Hall KC, which were accepted in full in May 2025? To ask this House to deliver a watertight defence in a single afternoon is a tall order and risks the Bill being seen as a rapid answer rather than a complete answer. Such accelerated progress risks important areas not being properly covered or provisions having unintended consequences.
Good legislation also involves scrutiny and input from outside Parliament. The media and experts from a wide range of professional fields are normally critical in improving a Bill. However, the speed of this Bill’s passage runs a real risk that much-needed external scrutiny will be missed.
The Bill addresses a critical gap. Looking to existing terrorism laws to deal with state organs was, in the words of the independent reviewer,
“shopping in the wrong department”.
By creating a power to designate bodies involved in “foreign power threat activity”, the Bill creates the right tool to penalise the proxies and hired guns that foreign powers use to carry out sabotage on UK soil.
The litmus test for the Bill will be the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—the IRGC. My noble friend Lord Marks has constantly argued that if the IRGC was not in power in Tehran, it would be universally recognised as a terrorist organisation. Yet, as drafted, this Bill is gentler on the IRGC than our laws are on the terrorists it funds.
We must also ensure that these powers have teeth in the global financial system. My noble friend Lord Purvis noted on 11 June that these groups operate through complex commercial, financial and now digital trade routes. We must use this Bill to trigger robust investigations by Companies House and the Financial Reporting Council to unmask front companies and starve designated organisations of UK-origin funds. However, I remain a bit concerned by the Minister’s comment that a UK connection of some sort is required for designation. In an era of digital interference, when state-backed proxies can target our citizens and sabotage our interests from behind a screen thousands of miles away, we must ensure that this requirement does not become a loophole. We need an assurance that this Bill is equipped for the era of digital interference, ensuring that hostile actors cannot evade designation simply by operating entirely from abroad via digital means.
We must also listen to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Development Committee. They warn that new Section 17B is so broad that it could unintentionally criminalise impartial humanitarian aid. Ministerial “intent” is not a legal safeguard. We need an express exemption on the face of the Bill for impartial humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, acting in accordance with international humanitarian law. Anything less leaves our aid workers at the mercy of a 14-year prison sentence for simply delivering life-saving medicine.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights has identified another trap. Clause 1 currently allows for designation without even establishing a link to a foreign power for certain acts, such as those under Section 4 of the 2023 Act. That is both too weak against our enemies and too broad for a free society.
On future-proofing, the director-general of MI5 has rightly warned of the next frontier: autonomous AI systems that may evade effective human control. The Government’s own AI Scenarios 2030 report admits that such systems could cause “existential harms” without intervention. I will be moving a specific amendment in committee to ensure that “foreign power threat activity” captures the development of super-intelligent AI capabilities by a foreign power.
Finally, because this is a fast-track Bill, we must have a 12-month statutory review of its adequacy. We also need the safeguard that any removal of a designation must be approved by votes in both Houses. Parliamentary oversight must exist at the end of a designation, not just the beginning.
As I said, we will not hold this Bill up, but we will seek to amend it. We are talking about individuals who actively assist hostile states in sabotaging our nation. We owe the citizens and residents who are being specifically targeted by these lethal plots more than just sincere intentions; we owe them a law that holds up in the courtroom and at the border. We look forward to a rigorous, if brief, Committee stage.
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My Lords, I support the Bill, based as it is on a proposal from my admirable successor as independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall KC. It is regrettable that the Bill is being brought forward more than a year after his recommendation, yet in a manner that telescopes and truncates the debate in both Houses. How much more useful and productive it would have been to have seen a draft Bill, its scrutiny unrestrained by tight deadlines and positions already taken.
My remarks today are aimed not at what the Bill intends to do but at the law which, I am afraid, exemplifies the law of unintended consequences. Two of the new offences, in proposed new Sections 17B and 17C, have the potential to damage conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and humanitarian activity—endeavours in which this country excels—in parts of the world controlled by bodies liable to designation. I shall explain briefly why that is and how I think the problem might be resolved.
I declare a non-pecuniary interest as a chair of Inter Mediate, an independent peacemaking charity founded in 2011 by Jonathan Powell, who is now, of course, the Government’s National Security Adviser. Inter Mediate’s staff work discreetly at the highest political levels to support complex negotiations and conflict resolution in some of the most troubled parts of the world. It will not surprise noble Lords to learn that work of that kind requires intensive dialogue with brutal and unpleasant regimes to which it may be difficult, even impossible, for western Governments to speak.
I am also grateful to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the various peacebuilding and humanitarian organisations, from Conciliation Resources to Save the Children and the Halo Trust, that have approached me with their concerns in relation to this issue. I thank the Minister and his Bill team for our discussions on this issue since the Bill was published two weeks ago.
What do I mean by the “unintended consequences” of the Bill? Take proposed new Section 17C, which is about obtaining, accepting, agreeing to accept or retaining material benefits from a designated body. That is an offence punishable by 14 years in prison—quite right, too—as in the cases highlighted in the Explanatory Notes, such as a business assisting a hostile state with new military technology or a contract criminal who knew, or should have known, where his fee was coming from.
However, “material benefits” are defined in proposed new Section 17C(3) with remarkable breadth. They include
“financial benefits, anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information”.
Taking that definition at face value, the likes of Inter Mediate could contravene criminal law by accepting information from a designated body as to that body’s objectives or negotiating stance. The defence of reasonable excuse in proposed new subsection (7) applies only to the retention of information; there is no such defence for agreeing to accept information or accepting it. There is a protection for public servants in proposed new subsection (8)(b), but not for charities or churches, which often have reach that Governments do not. One thinks of a charity such as the Halo Trust. Wishing to clear a minefield, it asks the IRGC, once designated, where the mines were laid. That, too, on a plain reading of proposed new Section 17C, would constitute the criminal offence of agreeing to accept information—although only 10 years in prison for that one.