#
My Lords, I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft instrument, which will see three bodies designated: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, and the GRU Volunteer Corps. I know that there has been significant interest in the House in this matter from both Opposition and Liberal Democrat Benches. I hope that they will welcome these regulations today.
Threats from foreign powers and their proxies have grown in scale and complexity. Designation is a powerful tool for disrupting state bodies and those acting in concert with them, and it sends a strong message of the UK’s commitment to tackling foreign power threat activity globally. The Home Secretary has determined that these three bodies are involved in foreign power threat activity and, as such, we propose to designate them under this new power, as I suggested we may do when the Bill, now an Act, went through Parliament recently.
Before I give more detail of the bodies in question, it is worth setting out the legislative basis for this decision. For a body to be designated, the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is involved in foreign power threat activity, as defined in the National Security Act 2023. The definition of foreign power threat activity covers the most serious offences in the Act, including espionage, sabotage and foreign interference. It also covers broader activity that constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety when carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. If that test is met, the Home Secretary must then consider whether designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. She will take into account considerations of foreign policy and the impact on human rights as part of that decision-making process.
Once a group is designated, it will be a criminal offence within the UK’s jurisdiction to support a designated body, assist a designated body or obtain material benefits from a designated body. The penalties for these offences are imprisonment for up to 14 years and/or a fine. Where an individual commits certain espionage conduct or sabotage for a designated body, this can attract sentences of up to life imprisonment. Designation therefore enables law enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt designated bodies more effectively.
Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary will exercise this power only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence, including intelligence material and cross-government advice. A decision to designate is taken only after great care and consideration, and, as noble Lords will know, it must be approved by both Houses. It was approved by the House of Commons yesterday evening.
For the benefit of noble Lords I will give some explanation of the bodies in question. First, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a group that has been commented on significantly in this House over many months, before the gracious Speech and since. The long-standing threat posed by Iran and its proxies is no secret. We know that the Iranian intelligence services have established a pattern of targeting dissidents, Persian-language media organisations and journalists, as well as Jewish and Israeli communities globally.
The IRGC Quds Force and IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. As a key component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, the IRGC is answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Its role extends beyond conventional military operations and includes intelligence activity, the use of proxy actors and influence operations designed to advance Iranian state objectives. Activity linked to the IRGC has included threats to life and intimidation on UK soil, including credible plots to target individuals in the United Kingdom. The IRGC supports militant actors overseas and has been associated with cyber and other state threats activity aligned with Iranian state objectives. I know that noble Lords across all parts of this House have great concerns about that body.
The Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, otherwise known as Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyah, has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities and Persian-language media, including an antisemitic attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March, a well-known arson attack that Members will be aware of. Sitting behind the IMCR were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, who almost certainly directed IMCR attacks across Europe. These incidents, including acts of arson and intimidation, have caused real fear and distress and have had a profound impact on those communities. It is clear that this sustained activity directly threatens the safety and interests of the United Kingdom.
The GRU Volunteer Corps is Russia’s threat to the United Kingdom in a form that extends far beyond conventional military action to include state threats. Moreover, the Kremlin increasingly relies on proxy organisations to pursue its objectives, seeking to undermine our security while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The so-called GRU Volunteer Corps is a clear example of that approach. It is not an independent force, nor a loose collection of volunteers; it is a proxy organisation operating under the direction and control of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service.
These formations are directed, supported and sustained by the GRU and are already operating across conflict zones, most notably in Ukraine in support of Russia’s illegal invasion. What we are seeing is a conscious attempt by the Russian state to blur the lines between military action, intelligence activity and criminality, using deniable forces to carry out sabotage, destabilisation and violence beyond its borders. This is not conjecture. It reflects a pattern of behaviour that underpins Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and that has been seen repeatedly across Europe, including here in the United Kingdom.
In 2024, two men organised an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned business in east London. They acted on behalf of the Wagner Group—another proxy body that acts on behalf of the Russian state and is proscribed as a terrorist organisation. It is notable that large parts of the Wagner Group have also been absorbed into this so-called Volunteer Corps, which demonstrates the threat posed to the United Kingdom by this group.
With noble Lords’ consent, these bodies will be designated. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has decided that there is sufficient evidence for her to reasonably believe that each body is involved in foreign power threat activity and that designation is necessary to protect the United Kingdom. Designation will strengthen our ability to disrupt these bodies and those who support and facilitate them. More broadly, it sends a powerful message to any foreign power or proxy that the United Kingdom will not allow harm to ourselves or our interests, and that we will do whatever it takes to prevent such activity on our soil.
In conclusion, these bodies operate in different ways but are united in their role of endangering the safety and interests of the United Kingdom through violence, intimidation and destabilisation. I know this House has called for designation. It is a proportionate and necessary response, and this Government will continue to use every available tool to confront state threats wherever they arise. I commend this instrument to the House.
#
My Lords, we on these Benches fully support these designations. We consistently supported the proscription of the IRGC throughout the passage of the Crime and Policing Act, to which the Minister has referred. It had been our party policy for some years, as it had been the policy of the Labour Party before the last general election. Nevertheless, the Government preferred to pursue the course, as recommended by Jonathan Hall KC, of passing the National Security (State Threats) Act. We passed fast-track legislation through this Parliament extremely quickly, not without amendment but with careful, though fast, consideration. We are now improving it in a number of ways, with an eye to promised security legislation in the future. We on these Benches regarded the Act, and the amendments negotiated to it when it was before the House, as a good example of what can be achieved by cross-party co-operation.
As the noble Lord explained, these designations respond to no fewer than seven attacks publicly claimed by the IMCR—the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, also known as Harakat—which is one of the bodies designated under these regulations. These were attacks within the United Kingdom that were linked to Jewish and Israeli communities. They included setting fire to the four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March, and attacks on some Persian language media and their journalists. The designation of the IRGC also fulfils the promise made to the Jewish community by the Prime Minister in April when he visited Kenton United Synagogue following the appalling arson attack there. That promise was that action would be taken this July to legislate for powers akin to proscription to outlaw foreign state actors and respond to threats posed by the IRGC. This designation amply responds to and fulfils that promise.
This designation of the IRGC by the United Kingdom follows the designation of the IRGC by the European Union in February this year in the aftermath of the violent repression of unarmed protesters in Iran over the turn of the year, which saw mass arrests, executions, internet shutdowns and the open use of lethal force against many thousands of demonstrators, as well as more international activity.