National Security

I beg to move, That the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved. I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft statutory instrument, which will see three bodies designated: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, and the GRU Volunteer Corps. Threats from foreign powers and their proxies have grown in scale and complexity, and we have just had a debate about one of the areas of the world from where these threats emanate. Designation is a powerful tool for disrupting state bodies and those acting in concert with them, and it sends a strong message about the UK’s commitment to tackling foreign power threat activity globally. The Home Secretary has determined that the three bodies are involved in foreign power threat activity, so we propose to designate them under this new power. Before I give more detail on the bodies in question, it is worth setting out the legislative basis of the decision. For a body to be designated, the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is involved in foreign power threat activity, as defined in the National Security Act 2023. The definition of “foreign power threat activity” covers the most serious offences in the Act, including espionage, sabotage and foreign interference. It also covers broader activity that constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety when carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. If that test is met, the Home Secretary must then consider whether designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. She will take account of considerations such as foreign policy and the impact on human rights. Once a group is designated, it is a criminal offence within the UK’s jurisdiction to support, assist or obtain material benefits from that designated body, and the penalties for such offences are imprisonment for up to 14 years and/or a fine. Where an individual commits certain espionage conduct or sabotage for a designated body, this can attract sentences of up to life in prison. Designation therefore enables law enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt designated bodies more effectively. Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary will exercise this power only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence, including intelligence material and cross-Government advice. A decision to designate is only taken after great care and consideration, and it must be approved by both Houses. I turn now to the bodies in question, starting with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The long-standing threat posed by Iran and its proxies is well established; indeed, we have literally just debated it. We know that the Iranian intelligence services have a pattern of targeting dissidents, Persian-language media organisations and journalists, and Jewish and Israeli communities globally. The IRGC Quds Force and the IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. As a key component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, the IRGC is answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Its role extends beyond conventional military operations and includes intelligence activity, the use of proxy actors, and influence operations that are designed to advance Iranian state objectives. Activity linked to the IRGC has involved threats to life and intimidation on UK soil, including credible plots to target individuals in the United Kingdom. The IRGC also supports militant groups overseas, and has been associated with cyber-attacks and other state threats that are actively aligned with Iranian state objectives. I will move on to the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right. The IMCR has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities and to Persian-language media, including the antisemitic arson attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March. Sitting behind the IMCR are members of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, who almost certainly directed attacks across Europe by the IMCR. These incidents, including acts of arson and intimidation, have caused real fear and distress, and they have a profound effect on the communities affected. It is clear that this sustained activity directly threatens the safety and the interests of the United Kingdom. On the GRU Volunteer Corps, Russia’s threat to the United Kingdom extends far beyond conventional military action. The Kremlin increasingly relies on proxy organisations to pursue its objectives, seeking to undermine our security while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The so-called GRU Volunteer Corps is a clear example of that approach. It is not an independent force or a loose collection of volunteers. It is a proxy organisation operating under the direction and control of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service. These formations are directed, supported and sustained by the GRU, and they are already operating across conflict zones, most notably in Ukraine in support of Russia’s illegal invasion. We are seeing a conscious attempt by the Russian state to blur the lines between military action, intelligence activity and criminality, using deniable forces to carry out sabotage, destabilisation and violence beyond its borders. This is not conjecture; it reflects a pattern of behaviour that underpins Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and has been seen repeatedly across Europe, including here in the United Kingdom. In 2024, two men organised an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned business in east London on behalf of the Wagner Group, another proxy body that acts on behalf of the Russian state, and which is proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK. It is notable that large parts of the Wagner Group have been absorbed into the so-called Volunteer Corps, which demonstrates the threat posed to the UK. With the House’s consent, these bodies will be designated. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has decided that there is sufficient evidence for her reasonably to believe that each body is involved in foreign power threat activity, and that designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. Designation will strengthen our ability to disrupt these bodies and those who support and facilitate them. More broadly, it sends a powerful message to any foreign power or proxy intent on harming the United Kingdom or our interests. We will do whatever it takes to prevent such activity on our soil. This debate is a significant moment, because this is the first use of a new power introduced by this Government to answer an urgent need. We are taking action because the three bodies in question, in their different ways, pose a threat to our country, and because designation is a necessary and proportionate response to their activities. With that, I commend the regulations to the House.

I call the shadow Minister.

It is right that these measures have been brought forward, and the Opposition will support them. The powers Parliament created through the National Security Act exist for precisely this purpose. They are there to respond to hostile state activity and those who threaten our national security. It is right that they are now being used. That said, we have consistently argued that these powers should have been deployed sooner, particularly against the IRGC. We made the case repeatedly because the threat was clear. While it is disappointing that it has taken this long, it is nevertheless welcome that action is now being taken against these organisations. As we heard throughout today’s earlier debate, Iran continues to pose a serious threat to the United Kingdom. It seeks to intimidate, to interfere and to undermine our security, often through the use of proxies and affiliated organisations. That is why it is right that the regulations do not focus solely on the IRGC itself. The Iranian regime does not operate through one organisation alone. It relies on a network of proxies to spread fear, conduct hostile activity and threaten those it regards as opponents. The Minister has already set out clearly why each of these organisations meets the test for designation, so I will not repeat those arguments, but it is important that we recognise the danger they pose.

The hon. Gentleman says that he wished the Government had acted sooner. Did the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 not get Royal Assent a week or two ago? I think our Ministers have acted very quickly indeed.

We put in place powers that assist in this. The first duty of any Government is to keep the public safe, regardless of which party is in office. We introduced the National Security Act 2023. The Minister and I have had many debates on this subject, pushing for action, and we have been clear and consistent that the powers should have been used much more quickly. If the Government are now doing what is necessary to protect the public, they will have our support. National security should not be a political football. Groups such as the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right demonstrate how quickly new organisations can emerge, targeting people here in the United Kingdom while often acting on behalf of hostile states. We know that their activities have included threats against dissidents and particular hostility towards Britain’s Jewish community. That brings me to a wider point. The rise in antisemitism we have seen in recent years is deeply disturbing. Jewish people in this country should never have to look over their shoulder because of who they are or what they believe. Equally, those who have come to Britain to escape authoritarian regimes should be able to live here free from intimidation and fear. Protecting those communities is not optional; it is a fundamental responsibility of the state. These organisations, and those who support them, should face the full force of the law. Parliament has provided the powers; now they must be used robustly. When the 2026 Act was before this House, we spent a great deal of time scrutinising how the powers would work in practice. We asked whether there were gaps in the legislation and whether hostile actors might find ways around them. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could reassure the House that the operation of these new powers is being kept under close review, their effectiveness is being assessed, and, if weaknesses emerge, the Government will not hesitate to act. But legislation alone will never be enough. The organisations we are dealing with today are driven by ideologies that reject everything this country stands for. They seek to divide communities, spread hatred and undermine confidence in our democratic way of life. They do not believe in debate; they believe in intimidation. They do not persuade; they threaten. That is why our response has to be broader than enforcement alone. Of course we need strong policing. Of course we need capable intelligence agencies. Of course we need robust legislation. But we also need confidence in who we are as a country. We need to defend the values that unite us: democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech. Those are not abstract ideas. They are the very things these organisations seek to attack. If we are serious about protecting our national security, we must do both: relentlessly pursue those who threaten us, while strengthening the resilience of the society they seek to undermine. That is why we support the regulations today. They are an important step and they send a clear message that those acting on behalf of hostile states, or supporting those who do, will find no safe haven in the United Kingdom.

As Russia becomes increasingly boxed in in Ukraine, it looks towards horizontal escalation. I welcome today’s announcement and the move to proscribe some of these groups. The IRGC, GRU and the SVR—multiple different organisations—are seeking ways to undermine our democracy, using physical, electronic, financial, diplomatic and a multitude of other avenues to try to undermine the right to self-determination, the centrality of democracy in the western world, and, importantly, the way in which we govern. As we move towards an increasingly fractious and dangerous period of time with Russia and in the middle east, will the Minister, in her summing up, say what more we can do to clamp down on hostile state disinformation, Russian disinformation in particular, on social media?

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

The Liberal Democrats will support the regulations, which are welcome if somewhat overdue. We have argued for years that the IRGC should face much tougher action here in the United Kingdom. Despite successive Governments recognising the threat, they did not act until now, so the regulations are very welcome indeed. The IRGC is central to the Iranian regime’s repression at home and its destabilising activities abroad. It is backing proxy groups targeting dissidents overseas and poses a direct threat to people here in the UK. The new designation powers recognise that modern threats extend far beyond conventional warfare. Espionage, cyber-attacks, foreign interference and intimidation carried out on behalf of hostile states all threaten our national security. I also recognise and welcome the designation of the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, and Russia’s GRU so-called Volunteer Corps. However, designation alone is not enough, so will the Minister tell the House what additional resources are being provided to ensure that the powers are properly enforced? How will the Government identify and prosecute those acting on behalf of those organisations here in the UK? I also hope that the Minister can say more about protecting those at risk. Members of Britain’s Iranian diaspora and our Jewish communities deserve confidence that the measures will deliver real protection. The regulations should from part of a wider strategy. Hostile states increasingly rely on cyber-operations, disinformation and political interference. Britain must continue to strengthen our resilience and work closely with our allies to meet those threats. The regulations are a welcome step, and the Liberal Democrats support them.

I call Mark Sewards for the final Back-Bench contribution—not on a five-minute speaking limit but with 60 minutes of debate left.

I have 60 minutes to make 60 points—no, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will speak very briefly, as I feel I have already taken enough of the House’s time on this issue. I commend the Government for bringing forward the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 and for designating the IRGC almost as soon as it received Royal Assent. I gently say to the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers)—who said many things that I agreed with—that while he talks about the length of time it has taken, it was a delivered by a Labour Government, despite all the time that the Conservatives had in office. But that is the only party political point I seek to make in this debate—

The hon. Member has 59 minutes left.

The right hon. Gentleman tempts me, but I am not going to take the offer. The IRGC is a direct threat to the safety of the British-Jewish community. We have known that for a long time, and unfortunately the evidence has stacked up as the years have rolled on. We have seen Hatzola ambulances, which served the whole community, not just the Jewish community, set ablaze; we have seen synagogues and community centres firebombed; and we have seen Jewish people stabbed on the streets of Golders Green. It is past time that we designate the IRGC as the threat to this country that it is. I am reminded—especially today of all days, after the Prime Minister’s final Question Time—that it was the Prime Minister who went to the Jewish community in April and made two promises: first, that the legislation would be brought forward in the King’s Speech and prioritised; and secondly, that he would use it to designate the IRGC. I am so pleased that today, after his final Prime Minister’s Question Time, he has fulfilled both promises. I am eternally grateful for the work that the Prime Minister did to transform my party. I think back to 2019 and the worst defeat that we had suffered since 1935 and remember feeling that my party may never come back. But the Prime Minister turned it around, made us face the public, rid us of the poison of antisemitism and delivered the second-biggest majority of my party’s history. As I make the short journey over to the parliamentary Labour party office to nominate my right hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham), in the spirit of unifying behind out next leader, to succeed the Prime Minister—assuming this debate is done by 6 pm—I place on record my thanks to the person who delivered this historic Labour majority, and who is directly responsible for my job and the jobs of many of my colleagues. After all, serving as a Member of Parliament is the greatest privilege in the world, and I will always be grateful to the Prime Minister for that.

Mr Sewards, you have left many minutes on the clock for a change.

I am tempted to say hold my beer, as there are 50 minutes left, but I suspect that many people will want to have their beers elsewhere, in front of a larger screen than we have in this House. I am grateful to all colleagues who have contributed to the debate. The bodies that we have discussed today—the IRGC, the IMCR and the GRU Volunteer Corps—represent different manifestations of a common challenge: foreign power threat activity conducted directly by states through proxies. The hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) asked why it has taken so long to take this action. This power has been developed specifically to address the growing challenge posed by state-linked bodies where it is not always appropriate to use existing counter-terrorism powers. It provides a targeted and proportionate means of disrupting those involved in foreign power threat activity based on the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of state threat legislation. To answer the hon. Member’s question, we had to have that review by Jonathan Hall and look at the way in which current terrorism legislation is working. We then had to change the law to create this new designation, which is akin to proscription, but in the different context of states—one cannot proscribe a state and suddenly announce that it does not exist, but one can designate proxies that act on behalf of states, which gives our intelligence and police services very similar powers to deal with the malign influence that they seek to bring to bear on our shores. Designation will disrupt these bodies and those that support or facilitate them by providing stronger tools to our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. It will mean that anyone who supports, assists or obtains material benefit from these organisations will face sentences of up to 14 years in prison, and will make it easier to prosecute certain offences under the National Security Act 2023. The hon. Member for Stockton West talked about getting that Act on the statute book in 2023. At the time, I was serving on the Intelligence and Security Committee from the Opposition Benches. The ISC brought to the House various amendments to that Act, hoping to make it better. I now see from the other side—from the Government Benches—that it has made it easier to use. So that the House can take an assessment, I note also that designations for the foreign influence registration scheme are also up and running—something else that this Government have done that makes it easier for us to keep an eye on what is going on on our shores. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) and the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) widened the debate slightly from the threats facing us to talk about the threats to destabilise our democracy and to ask what we can do about social media companies and the disinformation and misinformation that is swirling around us at the moment. In the context of designation, the regulations now introduce offences relating to supporting the GRU Volunteer Corps, the IRGC and the IMCR. We expect platforms to act responsibly and not to provide space for state threat-linked activity, propaganda or recruitment. We will be keeping a close eye on that, as well as liaising with social media companies to tell them about how this law impacts them. We are clear that any harmful propaganda and material has no place on the internet, and we will continue to take robust action in response if we see it there. The designation introduces the supporting offence, which enables us to talk directly to those hosting such material. Members including the hon. Member for Lewes and my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) talked about how important it is to defend our Jewish communities, and we all understand and support that. We all want to see antisemitism driven out of our country. This Government have introduced support for the Jewish communities who have been threatened and directly targeted by IRGC proxies. Just a couple of days ago, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced an extra £250 million for policing to ensure that we can support and protect our Jewish communities. In general, the kind of attacks on our democratic way of life that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak talked about have been aimed also at the Muslim community. The rise of hate speech, intolerance, grievance and division is an issue that I, as current chair of the defending democracy taskforce, am only too aware of. We have to tackle this across Government, and I promise the House that we are doing that. The debate has highlighted the seriousness of the threats posed, as did the debate we had before this one. All the cases that have been mentioned underline the need for a robust response to proxy activity on our streets that is state-directed. The United Kingdom faces a growing and evolving threat from foreign states and proxies acting on their behalf. Through this statutory instrument, we are strengthening our ability to respond effectively. We will protect our national security, support our communities and ensure that those who seek to undermine this country are met with a clear and firm response. I commend this instrument to the House. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved.