Concealed Surveillance Equipment in Government Offices and Vehicles

Lords Proceedings 10 June 2026 View on Hansard ↗
↓ Download transcript (Word) 22 contributions · 10 speakers
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In line with the practice of successive Administrations, this Government do not comment on the detail of internal security matters, but I can confirm that an electronic device was found in a communal area of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government during a routine security check. The device was not in or near ministerial offices, and it is currently being investigated by the appropriate agencies. The Government have also looked into the Daily Mail report and previous coverage and have not discovered any evidence of a tracking device being placed in Prime Ministers’ cars. This is based on inquiries made at the time, and more recently.
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My Lords—
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I am grateful to the noble Baroness, and to the Minister for that reply. That disclosure was made yesterday to a Select Committee in another place—that a Chinese cellular module was discovered in the then Prime Minister’s car—and on the previous day, there was a report of secret cameras being discovered in government offices. Surely that raises serious questions about the security of government departments, and the systematic use of both surveillance and indeed transnational repression by hostile states, including those states described by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, as being part of a “deadly quartet” of our country’s enemies. Is it true that the location of the cameras was where consideration of the proposed embassy of the People’s Republic of China was taking place? Will the Minister make an assessment of whether there has been undue influence as a result? When will the Government give effect to the unanimous call from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I have the honour to chair, that the People’s Republic of China should be listed with Russia and Iran in the upper tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?
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On the latter point, the Government keep all matters, such as registration under the FIRS, under review at all times. Again, it is not appropriate to comment on any consideration of that at this time. I also say to the noble Lord that it is not appropriate for me to comment on what is a live investigation into the circumstances that I have already admitted have happened in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. I strongly caution against any speculation at this time, because the Government will need to investigate that matter in due course. On the Chinese embassy decision, I say to the noble Lord that intelligence agencies were involved throughout the process and an extensive range of measures were developed to manage any risks. The planning decision was taken independently by the MHCLG Secretary of State and his conclusion is the result of a process that began in 2018. If I may, I return to my initial comments: the Government cannot comment on the detail of internal security matters, but those are being investigated by the appropriate agencies. I think it is best that we leave it at that.
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My Lords, with apologies for jumping the gun in my enthusiasm, perhaps the Government could comment on this. It is bad enough, although perhaps all too predictable, that there is illicit surveillance by way of, for example, hidden cameras. But what about when public money is actively used to procure cameras that originate, for example, in the People’s Republic of China? I know that the previous Government banned the new installation of Hikvision cameras in sensitive government buildings. Have they all been dismantled? What about banning them from the public estate more generally?
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My noble friend is pressing me to comment on these matters. I cannot comment on security issues—nor would the House, I suspect, wish me to do so—except to say that the Government will ensure that all matters in government activity are secure. The Government take every step they possibly can to make sure that the types of incidents my noble friend refers to do not happen and are prevented.
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My Lords, I am sure the whole House will agree that this is a highly disturbing and troubling discovery, which demonstrates the severity of the espionage threat that we face today. To pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, given that the camera was found in the offices where Ministers approved the application for the new Chinese mega-embassy, it seems highly likely that China or a person linked to China is behind this. Surely this has to serve as a wake-up call for the Government, so how can they still go ahead with allowing China to build a massive spy hub in the middle of London after this?
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Again, I would caution the noble Lord about jumping to conclusions as to who, what, where or when was behind the device that was found. I genuinely caution him on that but, with regard to the Chinese embassy, I can say that the planning decision was taken independently; the intelligence services have been involved throughout; there have been extensive negotiations; and the Chinese Government themselves have agreed to consolidate their seven current sites in London into one, which brings clear security advantages for the United Kingdom. The noble Lord has made interesting points and we will examine, and determine, the facts in due course.
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My Lords, the Minister and the Government have emphasised, understandably, that the camera was not in a location used by Ministers. However, with due respect to Ministers, civil servants can be pretty important as well. Is the Minister able to give us any information about exactly where the camera was located and who uses that area? Can he reassure us that just because the camera was not in a place that Ministers use, that is no reason to downplay the importance of this issue or of an appropriate response by the Government in due course?
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I hope the noble Lord will rest assured that the Government take this matter extremely seriously. They have and will investigate what has happened. I hope he can understand that I do not wish to comment on where and how the information came to light. But I have confirmed to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, that the facts of the case as reported are correct. It would be best for us to investigate this through the appropriate agencies and, in due course, come to conclusions in government to understand what has happened and how.
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I declare my interest as director of the Free Speech Union. Can the Minister give some indication of when Section 9 of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act is likely to commence? I understand that the Government are keeping it under review. This is the section that requires English universities to include in their annual reports to the Office for Students the funding they receive from foreign states. This is so that the OfS can monitor whether those foreign states are trying to interfere in freedom of speech or academic freedom on those university campuses.
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I am grateful to the noble Lord. If he will allow me, I will write to him on that point—for the simple reason that universities fall within a different department from the one that I have responsibility for. But I will examine that and report back to him as soon as possible.
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My Lords, I fear that my noble friend the Minister will probably repeat an answer that he has already given about five times; in particular, to the noble Lord, Lord Pack. Precisely where within the department this camera was found makes a world of difference. The Minister used a very careful form of words: he talked about common areas, and an area that was not close to Ministers’ offices. By “common areas”, did he mean those in which the public or visitors were quite frequently present, or does “common areas” mean that it was concealed within a toilet area? If it was a toilet area, I suspect we would be having a very different conversation as that would imply that it may be an internal matter with an internal member of staff, rather than anything else. Without prejudicing any of the other things my noble friend has said, is he able to enlighten us?
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In short, no. I am trying to be helpful, as is my nature, but there are certain things I cannot be helpful with. One of them is anything that may give further information about or prejudice investigations into the important matter of the location of any device found. As I have said to the House, it was not in or near a ministerial office, but we are investigating and there will be an examination of what happened. I would hesitate to speculate as to who, what, where, why or when until such time as the investigation has occurred.
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My Lords, the Minister is always helpful in the replies that he gives to the House, but I press him further on the second limb of the question I put to him about the discovery of cellular modules in a former Prime Minister’s car. This was not something just reported in a newspaper, as he said to the House. This was mentioned yesterday at the Business Select Committee in another place by Mr Charles Parton, who served as one of our senior diplomats and is one of this country’s leading experts on China—and also on cellular modules. At a meeting that I chaired last night in your Lordships’ House, Mr Charles Parton said it again. Will the Minister at least look at the record of the Select Committee, and undertake to have a conversation with Mr Parton?
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I will repeat my answer in the interests of clarity for the noble Lord. We have looked into the reports and previous coverage and have not discovered any evidence of a tracking device being placed in Prime Ministers’ cars. That is based on inquiries made at the time and again more recently. I cannot be clearer than that. An investigation has taken place and no evidence has been provided. I saw the individual make these allegations on television last night, but I can only repeat my understanding of the security services’ follow-up of those investigations. What I have said to the House today is my current understanding of the position.
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The Minister said that the camera was found in a routine inspection. Have the Government instigated more frequent inspections as a result of this discovery?
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Again, with due respect to this Chamber, this Chamber is not the place for me to outline how often, when, where and how the Government undertake security checks on buildings or vehicles. I hope that the noble Lord, who I know takes an interest in these matters, will understand that it is the Government’s first priority to keep our workings internally secure, and it is important that we do that. I assure him that that is what the Government are doing.
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To return to an element of the original Question from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, does the Minister agree with the director-general of MI5 that China is seeking to influence our political system?
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China influences our political system in many ways, and the Government will not tolerate any foreign interference from any state actor targeting the UK. We have been consistent and unambiguous in our assessment that China presents a series of threats to the UK. We have to do business with China still and recognise China, and we have to work with China on a number of areas of common interest—but, self-evidently, there are a number of significant threats that China poses. We keep those under review and, in all our dealings with the nation of China, we bear those aspects of work in mind.
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Have parliamentary Members’ offices been checked for any of these devices, in the other place and in this place? I imagine that foreign powers could be quite interested in the conversations going on in the offices of certain Members of Parliament. Is there is a usual check of our offices?
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It is an interesting and potentially helpful question. I do not have jurisdiction over this building, either in the House of Lords or in the House of Commons—that is a matter for the Speaker and the Lord Speaker, and the chief officers of both Houses. I think that they will have heard that response, and it may be possible for me to facilitate a reply on that to the noble Lord via those officers, but it is not a matter for me.

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